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1 INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are living somewhere in Pakistan, Yemen, or Gaza where the 
United States and its allies suspects a terrorist presence. Day and night, you hear a 
constant buzzing in the sky. Like a lawnmower. You know that this flying robot is 
watching everything you do. You can always hear it. Sometimes, it fires missiles 
into your village. You are told the robot is targeting extremists, but its missiles 
have killed family, friends, and neighbours. So, your behaviour changes: you stop 
going out, you stop congregating in public, and you likely start hating the country 
that controls the flying robot. And you probably start to sympathize a bit more 
with the people these robots, called drones, are monitoring.
1
 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereinafter 9/11), the United 
States (US) has initiated military operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, together with the 
United Kingdom (UK) against the de facto government of the Taliban in Afghanistan on 7 
September 2001 in order to eliminate Al-Qaeda and its associates from the territory of 
Afghanistan. After the fall of Taliban, a new government was established in Afghanistan in 
2002. Upon the invitation of the new government, the US has continued to use its military 
force against Al-Qaeda and its supporters in the region. However, in this new concept of fight 
against terrorism, the use of military force has not been limited to the territory of Afghanistan; 
rather the US expanded its use of drone strikesoutside Afghanistan such as Yemen, Pakistan, 
Somalia and elsewhere with particular focus of attacking against the members of Al-Qaeda 
and its supporters on an individual basis. In these attacks, which can also be called as targeted 
killings, the US has largely used its new technologically developed weapons called as drones. 
Drones (also known as unmanned aerial vehicles –UAVs) are powered aerial vehicles that do 
not carry a human operator, and can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be 
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. After 9/11,the role of 
drones evolved from reconnaissance to attack vehicle. Drones can fly for up to forty hours at 
altitudes greater than 60,000 feet (18.3 km), providing realtime intelligence to commanders. 
When a target of interest is detected, the same drone can attack it with its missiles.
2
 The use of 
drones to target and kill members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and associated forcesbegan under the 
Bush administration in 2002. The US military has controlled these operations in the conflict 
area of Afghanistan. Elsewhere, in northwest Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the CIA has 
                                                          
1
 Owen, Drones don‟t Just Kill. Their Psychological Effects are Creating Enemies, The Globe and Mail, (13 
March 2013), available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/drones-dont-just-kill-their-
psychologicAl-effects-are-creating-enemies/article9707992/  (17 April 2014) 
2
 O‘Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones  A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, Notre Dame Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43,2009, 4 available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144  (16 April 2013) 
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controlled and still controls operations. The number of CIA drone strikes has intensified since 
the Obama administration took office in 2009, making targeted killing a key to the 
administration's counterterrorism efforts. Although the use of drone strikes was efficient in 
elimination of the members of the terrorist organizations, the high number of civilian deaths 
and casualties caused a huge debate on the legality of drone strikes. According to Professor 
O'Connell, an American scholar, drone strikes have been killed 750-1000 unintended victims 
for the sake of killing nearly 20 leaders of Al-Qaeda by October 2009 in Pakistan. More 
detailed information on their capabilities and use is given in the following Chapter. 
 
 
1.1 Subject and Limitations 
 
The legal justification of the US for the use of drone strikes in fighting against terrorism under 
international law constitutes the main subject of the thesis. In fact, in order to legally justify 
its counterterrorism effort and particularly the use of drone strikes against terrorists in 
different countries, the US authorities pursued two alternative arguments. In his speech to the 
American Society for International Law's Annual Meeting in March 2010, the US State 
Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh claimed that: 
 ―…as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, 
as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may 
use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.‖3 
 
Having considered this contention, this thesis takes the issue of use of force in self-defense 
and in an armed conflict situation as the legal justification of the use of drone strikes under 
international law which constitutes the main subject of the thesis. Before delving into the use 
of force within the context of self-defense and armed conflict under international law, the 
second Chapter provides information on the historical background of the defense strategy of 
the US on countering terrorism to see how the US strategy has changed over the course of 
time, mainly after 9/11. In fact, whereas the counter terrorism strategy has been based on the 
law enforcement paradigm before 9/11, it has dramatically changed after that time and the US 
initiated the use of military force in the fight against terrorism. The second Chapter also 
presents information on the technology of the drones and their capacities particularly to show 
                                                          
3
Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (25 March 2010), available at 
http://www.State.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (19 April 2014) [hereinafter Koh Speech] 
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how these weapons are to be considered as military weapons that cannot be used by the police 
in peace time within the context of law enforcement effort. The same chapter also covers the 
historical process of the use of drone strikes by the US in counter terrorism effort. 
 
The third Chapter composes the literature review of the thesis. In this regard, the Chapter 
firstly focuses on the issue of resort to the use of force under the rules of the United Nation 
(UN) Charter. Although the prohibition of use of force, articulated in Article 2(4), is a 
cardinal principle of the UN Charter, States are not totally deprived of the right to use of force 
under all circumstances. In fact, Article 51 of the Charter provides the State parties with the 
right of individual or collective self-defense when an armed attack occurs. The first 
substantive part of the third Chapter seeks to establish,in the light of the debates in the 
doctrine, whether the concept of self-defense is restrictive or whether it might be widened in 
certain circumstances. 
 
Other types of resort to use of military force; the use of military force upon authorization of 
UN Security Council, the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the use of force 
under the concept of military intervention, the use of force upon invitation of another State 
remain  outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
The second substantive part of the third Chapter provides literature review for the use of force 
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In this regard, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and its Protocols of 1979 are the modem codifications of international humanitarian law 
which need to be taken into consideration as fundamental sources for the lawful use of force 
under IHL. However, the focus of this part is not the lawful use of  force under IHL but rather 
whether the principles of the IHL are applicable to the conflict between the enemy parties.  
 
The fourth Chapter is the main part of the thesis which presents how the US justifies its 
killings with drone strikes of terrorists under international law and critique whether the 
justification of the US may be legitimized under international law. The first substantive part 
of the fourth Chapter examines the justification of the use of drone strikes as a right of self-
defense in response to the attacks of 9/11. In this regard, the impact of the international 
response to 9/11, mainly UN Security Council resolutions, will be examined to see if the law 
of self-defense has been changed or not. The focus then turns on the legal justification of the   
US as a right of preemptive self-defense.  
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The second substantive part of the Chapter IVexamines  the justification of the use of drone 
strikes under international humanitarian law. In that sense, it particularly focuses on whether 
there exists an armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda and its supporters.  
 
At the outset, however, it is important to note that although the US has used drone strikes in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, the legal justification of the US for the 
use of drone strikes in Afghanistan does not constitute the particular focus of this thesis. In 
fact, it is generally accepted by the scholars that the conflict between the US and Afghanistan, 
the de facto government of Taliban, had started in 2001 as an international armed conflict 
until the fall of Taliban. Upon the invitation of the new Government, established in 2002, the 
use of drone strikes by the US in Afghanistan can be considered as being used within the 
context of non-international armed conflict. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the legal 
justification of the US for the use of drone strikes outside Afghanistan. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the use of drones (military force) in 
fighting against terrorism can be justified under international law. In fact, there are quite 
many studies carried out by the scholars on the legality of the use of drone strikes. The main 
theme of these studies are whether the killings of the terrorists with drone strikes has been in 
compliance with the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality. However, it is highly 
important to note that, in order to discuss the legality of killings with drones of terrorists and 
to assess the collateral damage there must be either an international or non-international 
armed conflict between the US and the terrorists so as to the IHL principles be applied to 
drone strikes. In the absence of an armed conflict the whole discussions on the assessment of 
IHL principles would mean nothing from the point of view of international law. Therefore, 
before delving into the legality of drone strikes under the law of armed conflict, one must 
clearly determine if there exists an armed conflict situation between the parties of the conflict. 
 
On the other hand, fighting against terrorism has always been the matter of law enforcement 
effort. That‘s to say, fighting against terrorism is a matter of international human rights law. 
Therefore, killing the members of terrorist organizations with the military weapons without 
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warning cannot be justified under international law.  At this juncture, the critical question is 
how the US justifies its use of drone strikes in killing members of Al-Qaeda and its supporters 
under international law.  Hence, the first purpose of this thesis is to clarify the legal 
justification of the US for its drone strikes against terrorists. The other purpose of the thesis is 
to evaluate and critique if the justification of the US can be justified in accordance with the 
international law.  
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
Having considered the fact that fighting against terrorism falls within the ambit of 
international human rights law and thatthe use of weaponized drones cannot be permissible in 
times of peace under the law enforcement paradigm, the critical question is how the US 
justifies its drone strikes in fighting against terrorism under international law? After clarifying 
the justification of the US,the next question is whether the reasoning of the US can be 
justified under international law. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The second chapter provides relatively detailed information on the US defense strategy as 
well as the capabilities of drones and its use from the perspective of historical background. 
The main sources for the US defense strategy are the official documents of the National 
Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy of the US. For the introduction of drones, 
news web sites as well as articles on the use of drones were used as source.  
 
The sources of the third chapter,which provides legal basis for the use of force in international 
law and in international humanitarian law, are the UN Charter, Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and its Protocols as well as the books and articles written by international lawyers.  
 
In the fourth chapter, which explains the US justification for drone strikes, the main sources 
are the argument and comments by the US leaders and officials. In this regard, the 
newswebsites as well as official speeches of the US presidents and officers has been used. In 
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addition to this, articles and comments by the scholars have been used as reference for a better 
analysis of the US justification. 
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2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 National Security Strategy of the US 
 
Before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 international terrorism has been also one of the major 
problem for the US and it ―has mounted an aggressive response to terrorism‖.4In A National 
Security Strategy for a Global Age promulgated in December 2000 by the then President 
William Clinton, the US strategy for the goal of combating terrorismarticulated that: 
Our strategy pressures terrorists, deters attacks, and responds forcefully to terrorist 
acts. It combines enhanced law enforcement and intelligence efforts; vigorous 
diplomacy and economic sanctions; and, when necessary, military force…Our 
strategy requires us to both prevent and, if necessary, respond to terrorism…When 
terrorism occurs, despite our best efforts, we can [never] give up on bringing its 
perpetrators to justice… It is our preventive efforts, such as active diplomatic and 
military engagement, political pressure, economic sanctions, and bolstering allies' 
political and security capabilities, that also require strong financial support in 
order to squeeze terrorists before they act.
5
 
 
It can be clearly seen that before 9/11 preventive measures are the main focus of the US 
National Security Strategy in combating against terrorism. In any case if a terrorist attack 
occurs the law enforcement function will come into play so as to bring the perpetrators into 
justice. However, the US National Security Strategy in combatting against terrorism has 
changed remarkably nearly one year after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 when the then President 
Bush promulgated his first National Security Strategy on 17 September 2002.
6
 In his 
introductory letter, President Bush underlines the danger of terrorism after 9/11, by noting 
that: 
Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of 
the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the 
past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, 
shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for 
less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open 
societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat 
we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland 
defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist 
                                                          
4
A National Security Strategy For A Global Age, The White House, December 2000, available at: 
http://history.defense.gov/docs_nss.shtml  (16 May 2014) 
5
 ibid 
6
 The White House, The National Security Strategy of The United States of America, (September 2002), available 
at: http://history.defense.gov/docs_nss.shtml  (20 May 2014), [hereinafter National Security Strategy-2002] 
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financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain 
duration.
7
 [emphasis added] 
 
It is clear that after 9/11 the US has put the military power into operation in combating against 
terrorism. In order to justify the use of military power the US brings forward the assumption 
that there exists a global war against terrorism. Whether the United States is legally at war 
with terrorism has been a matter of extensive debate within the academic community. Despite 
this controversy, in the minds of the national political and military authorities of the US there 
is no doubt that the US is really at war with terrorism.
8
  In this regard, under the goal of 
"strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and 
our fiends" the National Security Strategy-2002 expresses that: 
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach... 
It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an 
extended period of time… Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces 
continue to hunt down the Taliban and Al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield 
on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large 
with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and 
across Asia. Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations 
of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and 
communications; material support; and finances. We will disrupt and destroy 
terrorist organizations by […] using all the elements of national and international 
power and by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our 
borders.[…] we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of 
self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from 
doing harm against our people and our country…In the war against global 
terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic 
values and way of life.
9
 [emphasis added]  
 
Likewise, the other strategy and guidance documents explicitly recognize that the nation is 
waging a global war on terrorism. For example, the National Defense Strategy promulgated in 
March 2005 begins with express saying that ―America is a nation at war.‖10 In his 
introductory remarks to the NationalMilitary Strategy promulgated in in 2004 the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs Staff, Richard Myers, declares that ―while protecting the United States we 
must win the War on Terrorism.‖11 He also States that the attacks of 9/11 indicated that ―the 
                                                          
7
 ibid 
8
 Dalton, The United States National Security Strategy: Yesterday, Today, And Tomorrow, 52 Naval L. Rev. 
(2005), at 60, 63—64  
9
 National Security Strategy-2002, above note 6, 5 
10
 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (2005), 1, available 
at: http://history.defense.gov/docs_nds.shtml  (19 May 2014) 
11
 Chairman of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff, The National Military Strategy Of The United States Of America-A 
Strategy For Today; A Vision For Tomorrow, (2004), available at: http://history.defense.gov/docs_nms.shtml  
(20 May 2014) 
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prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass destruction, makes it 
imperative we act now to stop terrorists before they can attack again.‖12 
 
Moreover, it is also explicit from the remarks of the political and military leadership as well 
as the strategy documents that in the war against terrorism anticipatory or preemptive actions 
constitute the basis of the fighting strategy so as to eliminate the threat of terrorist attacks 
before they come into existence. For example, under the goal of "prevent our enemies from 
threatening us, our allies and our friends with weapons of mass destruction" the National 
Security Strategy-2002 elaborates that: 
We cannot let our enemies strike first…Traditional concepts of deterrence will not 
work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and 
the targeting of innocents… We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today‘s adversaries. Rogue States and terrorists do 
not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would 
fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of 
mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and 
used without warning. The United States has long maintained the option of 
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack. To forestall or prevent 
such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.
13
[emphasis added] 
 
For some authors the combination of these goals result in a radical new doctrine of 
international law on the use of force, a new Bush doctrine.
14
 This issue will be examined in 
details in the fourth Chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Use of Drones 
 
We can send a UAS to look down alleys, around buildings, in backyards or on a 
roof to see what‘s up there, dramatically increasing Soldier protection and 
preserving the force –a vital force multiplier in this era of persistent conflict.15 
                                                          
12
 ibid 
13
 National Security Strategy-2002, above note 6, 15 
14
 Gray, The US National Security Strategy and the New "Bush Doctrine" on Preemptive Self-defense, Chinese J. 
Int'l L. (2002), at 437, 438 
15
 US Army UAS Center of Excellence, "Eyes of The Army" U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 
2010-2035, 1 [hereinafter Eyes of The Army] http://www-
rucker.army.mil/usaace/uas/US%20Army%20UAS%20RoadMap%202010%202035.pdf  (20 May 2014) 
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         James O. Barclay 
Major General 
 
 
In his speech to the US Congress, shortly after 9/11 attacks, President Bush explained how to 
fight and win the war on terror by noting that ―[w]e will direct every resource at our command 
–every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, 
every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war– to the disruption and to the 
defeat of the global terror network.‖16 By referring to this speech some scholars argue that the 
use of drones plays a significant role in the counter terrorism effort for the Bush and Obama 
administrations.
17
 
 
 
2.2.1 Drone Technology 
 
The inception of the use of a drones dates back to 1919, when the creator of the gyroscope 
and autopilot technology, Elmer Sperry, operated a pilotless aircraft to sink a German 
battleship.
18
 From then on the technology of pilotless aircrafts has been progressed and used 
mainly for the purpose of surveillance.  
 
There are two generations of drones that the US was deploying: the Predator and the Reaper 
(also known as the Predator B) drone. An early version of the modern drone that is Predator 
RQ-1 (R for reconnaissance) drones first appeared in the Balkan wars of the 1990s and 
provided information for US military commanders. A modification  in design from RQ-1 to 
MQ-1 (M for multipurpose) made in 2002 with the equipment of the AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles, enabling reaction against intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, close air 
support, and interdiction targets.
19
 Since then, the upgraded Predator, the MQ-1B, have been 
developed.The MQ-1B Predator is an armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long-endurance 
(ability to stay aloft for forty hours) remotely piloted aircraft that is used primarily as an 
intelligence-collection asset and secondarily against dynamic execution targets.The Predator 
                                                          
16
 George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks, (20 September 2001), 
available at: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm  (20 May 2014) 
17
Barnidge, A Qualified Defense Of American Drone Attacks In Northwest Pakistan Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 30 B.U. Int'l L.J. (2012), at 409, 416  
18
 Eyes of The Army, above note 15, 4 
19
 Fact Sheets,  MQ-1B Predator, US Air Force, 20 July 2010, available at: 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx  (21 May 2014)  
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equipped with a highly advanced sensor suite, the Multi-Spectral Targeting System, which 
carries an infrared sensor, color/monochrome daylight TV camera, image-intensified TV 
camera, laser designator and laser illuminator. The infrared sensor enables it to see at night 
even in poor weather by sensing heat emissions. The full-motion video from each of the 
imaging sensors can be viewed as separate video streams or fused by means of which the 
available data is transmitted to its crew, troops on the ground, operations and intelligence 
centers, and commanders in real time. The operators can even switch back and forth between 
the various sources of information.
20
 Moreover, the Predator can launch two laser-guided Air-
to-Ground Missile-114 Hellfire missiles that possess highly accurate, low-collateral damage, 
and anti-armor, anti-personnel engagement capabilities.
21
Originally designed for anti-vehicle 
attacks, the Hellfire missiles that can be launched five miles from the target has a very limited 
effects radius since its explosive force is designed to penetrate forward into the target it is 
attacking. This feature hampered the use of Hellfire missiles against individuals ―who often 
escaped harm when located only a short distance‖.22 In order to put away this incapacity an 
anti-personnel version of the weapon has been developed and introduced with enhanced 
effects radius.
23
 
 
In October 2007, the Predator fleet was joined by the newer, faster, much larger and more 
powerful MQ-9 Reaper (also known as Predator B). MQ-9 Reaper is the first purpose-built 
hunter-killer drone that can deploy a payload of up to 14 hellfire missiles or a mixture of 
missiles and bombs.
24
MQ-9 Reaper is a highly sophisticated progress built on the experience 
gained with General Atomics Aeronautical Systems‘ (GA-ASI) battle-proven MQ-1B 
Predator and a major evolutionary leap in overall performance and reliability.
25
 The Reaper 
has a loiter capacity of thirty hours, a range of approximately 1000 miles and a speed of 230 
miles per hour. Like the Predator, it poses a version of the Multi-Spectral Targeting System 
and is equipped with a variety of highly sensitive sensors. In addition to the capacities of the 
Predator, however, the Reaper equipped with a synthetic aperture radar to enable future 
                                                          
20
 Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying The Oft 
Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. Int'l L.J. (2012), at 595, 598—599  
21
Enemark, Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency , Asian Security, vol. 7, no. 3, 
(2011), at 218, 220—221; Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 UAV, United States of America, available at: 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/rq1-predator/  (20 May 2014) 
22
 Schmitt, above note 20, 599 
23
 ibid 
24
Enemark, above note 21, 221; Sharkey, Death Strikes From The Sky: The Calculus Of Proportionality,  IEEE 
Technology And Society Magazine, Spring 2009, 17 
25
 General Atomics Aeronautical Aircraft Platform, Predator B UAS, available at: http://www.ga-
asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php  (21 May 2014) 
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GBU(Guided Bomb Unit)-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions- JDAM targeting. With respect to 
weaponry, the Reaper is more varied and advanced than the Predator. Besides the 
employment capacity of four laser-guided Hellfire missiles, it can be equipped with precision 
munitions, such as the GBU-38 JDAM and laser guided weapons like the GBU-12 Paveway 
II. Thanks to the weapons options, the Reaper has greater flexibility than the Predator when 
engaging targets. For instance, the Paveway can be used when a high degree of accuracy is 
required and the JDAM results in a greater blast effect than a Hellfire.
26
 
 
Despite the fact that drone sensors can survey potential targets consistently over long periods 
of time, providing huge amounts of information, it is nevertheless possible that this drone 
video footage can miss or fail to delineate some key information. According to Columbia 
Human Rights Clinic report: 
Although some drones may be capable of striking ―with pinpoint accuracy from 
an altitude 25,000 feet,‖ with cameras that can identify details as minute as 
whether an individual is missing an arm or wearing a hat, drone strikes can still 
result in mistakes and civilian casualties if the intelligence and underlying analysis 
is incorrect. Drones sometimes collect video footage in situations where civilians 
and targeted individuals co-mingle, in villages and urban areas. Some observers 
note that drone sensors do not provide a clear enough picture to distinguish 
individuals in these circumstances… During the later stages of targeting, drone 
operators may be hampered by what is known as the ―soda straw‖ effect. As a 
weaponized drone zooms in to pinpoint the target, it loses a wider picture of the 
area—like viewing a small amount of liquid through a soda straw, instead of the 
entire glass. The soda straw effect creates a risk that civilians may move into the 
vicinity of the strike without being noticed by drone operators, and therefore 
without having been considered as part of a targeting analysis… In one account, 
drone pilot Matt J. Martin describes the targeting of a truck in Afghanistan, 
apparently full of ―insurgents.‖ Viewed through Predator footage, the truck 
appeared to be far enough away from surrounding houses and pedestrians to be 
lethally targeted. The ground commander, who was also monitoring the Predator 
footage, gave clearance to take the shot. After the missile had been fired, two 
young boys unexpectedly appeared on the operator‘s screen, riding a bicycle. 
Martin describes his horror as he could do nothing but wait and watch as the 
missile killed the two boys together with the occupants of the truck.‖27 
 
 
By 2009, the US had about 100 Predators and 15 Reapers out of about 1000 ―combat-ready 
drones. This supply of drones is increasing rapidly. By early 2012, the Pentagon was said to 
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have 7,500 drones of all kinds in its arsenal, representing about one-third of all US military 
aircraft.
28
 
 
 
2.2.2 Drone Strikes 
 
Throughout the twentieth century drones were used primarily for surveillance, most notably 
during the Gulf War and the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s.
29
 The first known use of 
armed drones were used to attack a target in early October 2001 during Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan when the US Air Force used a drone to launch a Hellfire missile to 
kill Mohamed Atef, a reputed Al-Qaeda leader, in his home near Kabul.
30
 
 
Drone strikes have been operated by both military and the CIA. In hisarticle, Jane Mayer 
noted that: 
The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military‘s version, which is 
publicly acknowledged, operates in the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an extension 
of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.‘s program is aimed at terror suspects around 
the world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not based. It was initiated 
by the Bush Administration and […] Obama has left in place virtually all the key 
personnel. The program is classified as covert, and the intelligence agency 
declines to provide any information to the public about where it operates, how it 
selects targets, who is in charge, or how many people have been killed.
31
 
 
On the other hand, Columbia Human Rights Clinic Report suggests otherwise: 
 
Both the CIA and US military forces are involved in drone strikes. A common 
misconception is that US drone strikes fall neatly into two programs: the 
military‘s overt drone strikes in Afghanistan; and the CIA‘s covert strikes beyond 
Afghanistan. In fact, US government disclosures—mostly in the form of leaks to 
the press— suggest that the military and CIA are both involved in covert drone 
operations around the world.
32
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The CIA allegedly carried out its first drone strike with Predator in Afghanistan, where a 
strike killed three men suspected of being senior Al-Qaeda lieutenants in the ZhawarKili cave 
complex in Southeast Afghanistan in February 2002.
33
 On 3 November 2002, the US carried 
out a drone strike outside of a combat area. Reportedly, the CIA operated the drone from a 
base on Africa launching Hellfire missiles at a passenger vehicle traveling in in Yemen. In the 
strike all six persons in the vehicle were killed including a suspected top operative in Al-
Qaeda believed to have been one of the planners of the USS Cole attack in 2000 as well as a 
US citizen in his twenties from New York.
34
 In January 2003, in her report to the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or 
arbitrary killing qualified the attack as a ―clear case of extrajudicial killing.‖35 
 
Starting in 2004, the vast majority of US drone strikes have taken place in Pakistan by the 
CIA. The US reportedly notified the Pakistani government before launching strikes until 2006 
when the Pakistani government has publicly manifested its opposition for drone strikes as a 
violation of its sovereignty.
36
 Despite the objection of the Pakistani government, the number 
of strikes have increased dramatically to about 30 in 2008 and continued to climb in 2009 to 
about 50 and in 2010 to about 120 times.
37
 In 2012, on the other hand, the frequency of drone 
strikes increased again as a result of the concern that the CIA will soon have to stop 
operations due to the opposition of the Pakistani government.
38
  In 2006 the US has also 
conducted drones strikes in Somalia with a view to assisting Ethiopia in the invasion that it 
carried out to attempt to install a new government in Somalia.
39
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3 USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  
3.1 UN Charter(International Law) 
 
The United Nations Charter, one of the modern codifications of the principles of jus ad 
bellum, aims to maintain international peace and security and develop friendly relations 
among nations.
40
To secure this goal it imposes a strict rule against the use of force by member 
States. As enunciated by the International Court of Justice - ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United 
States
41
case, the UN Charter is based on the fundamental principle outlawing the use of force 
in international relations but for in limited circumstances.
42
 
 
Article 2(4),sets forth the Charter's guiding principle on the prohibition of the use of force, 
provides that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
43
 
 
Although Article 2(4) does not include an exception to the guiding principle on the 
prohibition of use of force, the Charter recognized limited instances in which the use of force 
would be necessary. 
 
 
3.1.1 Self-Defense 
 
The main exception to the prohibition on the use of force articulated in Article 2(4) is the right 
to self–defense which is provided in Article 51 and regulates that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
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under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.
44
 
In fact, there has been an extensive controversy over the scope of the right of self-defense. 
The main controversy, as a matter of treaty interpretation, has been focused on whether the 
Article 51 is an restrictive statement of the right to self-defense or whether  the scope of the 
right of self-defense might be widened by customary international law that goes beyond the 
right to counter to an armed attack.
45
 Whereas the supporter of the former maintained that 
since the self-defense in Article 51 is an exception to the prohibition of use of force in Article 
2(4), it should be interpreted as exhaustive and that wider interpretation deprives Article 51 
any purpose; that of latter argued that the opening phrase of the Article 51 spelling out that 
―nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense‖ carries a meaning that customary international law preserves a right to self-defense 
the scope of which is wider than the specific provisions of Article 51 and tolerate self-defense 
other than against an armed attack.
46
 
 
The ICJ in Nicaragua case, on the other hand, having taken a wider interpretation of Article 
51 established that there existed an inherent right of self-defense under customary 
international law as well as under the UN Charter and emphasized that: 
On one essential point, this treaty itself refers to pre-existing customary 
international law; this reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of 
Article 51, which mentions the ―inherent right‖ (in the French text the ―droit 
naturel‖) of individual or collective self-defense, which ―nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair‖ and which applies in the event of an armed attack. The Court 
therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that 
there is a "natural" or "inherent" right of self-defense, and it is hard to see how 
this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been 
confirmed and influenced by the Charter...Moreover, a definition of the ‗armed 
attack‘ which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the ―inherent right‖ of 
self-defense, is not provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot 
therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which ―subsumes and supervenes‖ 
customary international law.
47
 
 
With regard to the concept of armed attack, it can be observed that although the Article 51 
explicitly States that an attack which triggers the right of self-defense should be an armed 
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attack, it leaves its definition to the customary international law. In this regard, the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case discussed the notion of an ‗armed attack‘ and took the view that: 
it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as 
including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international 
border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack 
conducted by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein"… But the 
Court does not believe that the concept of ‗armed attack‘ includes not only acts by 
armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to 
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such 
assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of other States.
48
 
 
As it can be clearly seen from the Court‘s dictum, an armed attack which triggers the right of 
self-defense should not necessarily be carried out by a State itself, it rather can be conducted 
by non-State actors as well. In the latter case, however, there must be involvement  of a State 
in the attack which exceeds the threshold of mere assistance.   
 
In fact, whereas Article 2(4) of the Charter clearly mentions State actor on both sides in 
prohibiting the use of force, nothing in Article 51 specifies that the right of self-defense is 
only exists in response to a threat or use of force by another State, but for the only reference 
to a State as the potential victim of an armed attack.
49
 In this context, whereas it goes without 
saying that the right to self-defense applies to armed attack by other States, whether the right 
of self-defense applies in response to armed attack by non-State actors has been a 
questionable issue.
50
 Since the perpetrator of the armed attack is not prescribed as a State in 
the Article 51, it can be concluded by implication that an armed attack can be executed by 
non-State entities.
51
In fact, where there is an armed attack by non-State actors from the 
territory of target State, this would probably be a case of non-international armed conflict or 
domestic terrorism. In that case the Article 51 does not come into play. However, where non-
State actors are controlled from outside the target State by another State then the law of self-
defense applies.
52
 If non-State actors are only supported, rather than controlled by a State 
from outside the target State then the right of self-defense may not be utilized by the target 
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State against the assisting State unless the threshold laid down by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case is achieved.
53
 The Court in Nicaragua case noted that although the assistance, in the 
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support, could constitute a threat or use 
of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of that State, this does not 
reach to the threshold of armed attack that trigger the right of self-defense against the assisting 
State pursuant to Article 51. 
 
Another thorny subject is whether the acts of violence not attributable to any State may 
amounts to an armed attack within the context of Article 51, and thus activates the right of 
self-defense.
54
 Most of the commentators contended that the expression ‗armed attack‘ in 
Article 51 of the Charter does not refer to armed attack of every kind, irrespective of the 
source, but only to an armed attack unleashed by or under the control of another State.
55
 
Professor Dinstein, on the other hand, argues that, even in cases where the perpetrators are 
non-State actors maneuvering from a foreign State, an act of violence taken against a State 
may constitute an armed attack. He further maintains that, in any case, if self-defense is to be 
exercised by the target State against the non-State actors (terrorists, arm bands or the 
organized armed groups), any coercive measures will have to take place in the territory of a 
State where the attackers are headquartered or have taken refuge irrespective of the 
involvement of that State in the attack.
56
 In effect, this thorny subject became more of an issue 
among the scholars after the horrifying attacks of 9/11 by non-State actors in the absence of 
State involvement.
57
 Professor Gray argues that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have widened the 
notion of armed attack to cover acts by terrorist groups even in the absence of State 
involvement in the attack.
58
 This line of argument relies primarily on the response of the UN 
Security Council when it condemned the terrorist attack in its Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
which confirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
59
 More detailed 
discussions and arguments over this controversial matter will be presented in the fourth 
chapter.   
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3.1.2 Anticipatory or Pre-emptive Self-Defense 
 
As mentioned above, there has been a longstanding controversy over the scope of right of 
self-defense, in particular whether there exists a broader customary international law right of 
anticipatory self-defense independently of the UN Charter.
60
 The basis of the customary 
international law principle that a State could use necessary and proportional force when 
threatened with an imminent attack dates back to the famous Caroline doctrine.
61
 Despite 
criticism from some scholars over its interpretation, the famous Caroline incident of 1837 
established that States are not obliged to wait until an actual attack had occurred before 
exercising the right of self-defense.
62
 After the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, which 
provides the State parties with the right of self-defense only if an armed attack occurs , the 
legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense became less clear but more controversial. In today‘s 
world, given the modern weaponary system that can launch an attack with enormous speed 
and destructive effect, which may give the target State little chance for a successful counter 
attack against the armed assault, the prominence of the concept of anticipatory self-defense 
becomes more clear.
63
 
With regard to whether State practices  has formulated a customary law of anticipatory self-
defense after the adoption of the UN Charter, it has observed that in most of the cases when 
justifying their actions States did not actually refer to anticipatory self-defense, they rather 
relied on the right of self-defense in response to an actual armed attack under Article 51. The 
most significant occasion with  regard to an explicit invocation of anticipatory self-defense as 
a legal justification was in 1981 when Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor located near 
Baghdad.
64
 Israel claimed that: 
for a long time we have been watching with growing concern the construction of 
the atomic reactor "Ossirac". From sources whose reliability is beyond any doubt, 
we learn that this reactor, despite its camouflage, is designed to produce atomic 
bombs. The target for such bombs would be Israel. This was clearly announced by 
the ruler of Iraq. After the Iranians had inflicted slight damage on the reactor, 
Saddam Hussein stressed that the Iranians had attacked the target in vain, since it 
was being constructed against Israel alone. The atomic bombs which that reactor 
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was capable of producing whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium, 
would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of Israel 
progressively arose.‖65 
 
When debating in the Security Council, Israel was not able to rely on any clear State practice 
so as to justify its action that anticipatory self-defense was lawful, except relying only on a 
series of arguments by scholars.
66
The action of Israel was described by the Security Council 
Resolution 487 (1981) as a ―clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations‖ and was 
condemned by both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.
67
 However, the 
resolutions did not make any pronouncement on the fundamental doctrinal debate of 
anticipatory self-defense; instead,it left the question whether the condemnation should be 
considered as a total rejection of anticipatory self-defense or just a denial on the facts of the 
particular case open.
68
 This indicated the divergence of the views on that particular issue. 
While some States, including Mexico and Egypt, were particularly contested to any notion of 
anticipatory use of force, France and Italy condemned the Israeli action on the ground that 
they believed the facts did not establish the presence of a threat of imminent attack by Iraq.
69
 
The US, on the other hand, was the only State that unambiguously supported the concept of 
anticipatory self-defense.
70
 Although the reasoning for condemnation of Israeli action may 
vary, it is clear that the majority of the States denied the recognition of any right of 
anticipatory self-defense.
71
 
 
The ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, based its decision on the norms of customary international 
lawregarding self-defense that was triggered by the actual armed attack and expressed no 
view on the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack since the issue 
has not been raised before the Court.
72
Despite convenient occasions to address the 
controversial issue of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense, the ICJ has not showed any 
tendency to do that so far.
73
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3.1.3 Necessity and Proportionality 
 
The concepts of necessity and proportionality constitute the focal point of the right of self-
defense in international law.
74
 Notwithstanding the controversy over the scope of the right of 
self-defense there is no debate on the fact that, though not explicitly prescribed in Article 51, 
self-defense must be necessary and proportionate as a matter of customary international law.
75
 
In fact, the ICJ in the Nicaragua caseheld that, 
the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to 
regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any 
specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well 
established in customary international law.‖76 Likewise, in its Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court pointed out 
that "[t]he submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the conditions 
of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law‖ and that 
―[t]his dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the 
means of force employed.
77
 
 
Depending on the specificity of the case, the concept of necessity raises remarkable evidential 
as well as substantive issues. It is incumbent on the State to invoke self-defense to establish 
that, as a reasonable conclusion, on the basis of facts reasonably known at the time, an armed 
attack has already happened or is reasonably believed to be imminent and that the armed 
attack was definitively launched by a particular State against which it is forcibly responding. 
Moreover, the responding State should also substantiate that the armed attack unleashed by a 
particular State was premeditated rather than accidental or by mistake.
78
 
 
What is more important is that the responding State must ensure that resort to use of force was 
a necessity as a result of failure in practical or alternative solutions. Put differently, resort to 
use of force should not be necessary until it has been found out that peaceful measures are 
beyond reach. However, in cases where the situation offers no pause, it may not be practicable 
to consider any remedy as a substitute for the use of force in self-defense. In cases where 
there exists an interval of time, then friendly solutions should be pursued and the use of force 
should be considered as a last resort.
79
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On the other hand, the conditions in accordance of which the defensive action would 
commence according to Caroline doctrine is that the ―necessity of that self-defense is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.‖80 More 
information in this issue will be provided in the fourth Chapter within the context of the 
discussions regarding the use of force in anticipatory self-defense by the US against the 
members of non-State actors.  
 
 
3.2 The Law of Armed Conflict (International Humanitarian Law) 
 
Professor Schmitt perfectly expresses the situation to which the law of armed conflict applies: 
Whether States are acting in self-defense, engaging in hostilities in accordance 
with a Security Council resolution, maintaining or reestablishing internal order or 
even acting unlawfully, international humanitarian law applies to all parties as 
long as the threshold of armed conflict is reached. In the absence of an armed 
conflict, the actions of the parties are governed by rules of conduct set forth in 
human rights law and any governing domestic legal regime applies.
81
 
 
The law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law, applies to armed 
conflict situations and governs the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons during 
conflict.
82
 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols are the modem codification of 
jus in bello. However, in order for Geneva Conventions and its Protocols to be applied to an 
armed conflict, it is essential to determine the nature of the armed conflict as International 
Armed Conflict (IAC) or Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) since IHL has separated 
armed conflict into two categories. Whereas the   four Geneva Conventions and the Protocol I 
apply in IAC, only the Common article 3 and the Protocol II apply in NIAC.
83
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3.2.1 International Armed Conflict 
 
The definition of international armed conflict is embedded in the Common Article 2 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which articulates that: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
State of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to 
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, 
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
84
 
 
It goes without saying that the term in this provision ―High Contracting Parties‖ refers to 
States, thereby the parties to an international armed conflict would only be States. In the Tadic 
case the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) came up with the 
conclusion on the definition of international armed conflict and Stated that ―an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States.‖85 
 
In this regard when one or more States have resorted to use of force against another, then the 
rules of IAC come into play irrespective of the reason or the intensity of this encounter or of 
whether the parties to the conflict consider themselves to be at war with each other and how 
they describe this conflict.
86
Notwithstanding the notion of war already exists in the oldest 
treaties of international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 introduced the 
concept of armed conflict into this legal regime for the first time.
87
It is now well established 
that the application of  IHL is neither subject to declaration of a formal state of war by any 
party of the conflict, nor to the recognition of the state of war by one or both parties.
88
 This 
was confirmed by Pictet in the Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which 
pointed out that, 
any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the 
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Parties denies the existence of a State of war. It makes no difference how long the 
conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.
89
 
 
On the other hand, in order for the rules of international humanitarian law to be applicable, 
the conflict should reach to a certain level of intensity, beyond the exceptional incidents such 
as border clashes and naval incidents, and the attack must be motivated by the intention to 
harm the enemy rather than involuntarily or accidentally. In any case only the use of force by 
the organs of a State, rather than by private persons or other isolated groups, will constitute an 
armed conflict.
90
 
 
 
3.2.2 Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
The application of international humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts was 
only prescribed in treaty form for the first time in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At present, 
there are two main instruments which expressly apply to non-international armed conflicts in 
humanitarian law: Common Article 3 of the  Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II of 1977. Whereas Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
contains a series of essential provisions dealing with minimum fundamental humanitarian 
rights and duties, Additional Protocol II elaborates far more detailed provisions applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts.
91
 
Common Article 3 articulates that ―in the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the 
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions…‖92 Armed 
conflicts that are not of an international character are those in which at least one or more non-
governmental armed groups are involved in the conflict against the territorial State. Despite 
the lack of certainty in the text, it is well established that Common Article 3 applies to the 
hostilities take place only between armed groups within a State as well as between armed 
group(s) and government forces.
93
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In order to distinguish an armed conflict, in the meaning of common Article 3, from less 
serious forms of violence, specifically situations of internal disturbance sand tensions such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, the situation 
must reach a certain level of intensity and organization. These two components of the notion 
of non-international armed conflict cannot be explain in abstract terms and need to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
With regard to the level of intensity, it is important to notice that the confrontation must reach 
a minimum level of intensity and that the threshold of intensity required in that case is higher 
than that for an international armed conflict. This may be the case when the government is 
obliged to resort to use military force against the insurgents, as its police forces are no longer 
able to deal with the situation on their own.  In the determination of the level of intensity, in 
this regard, the duration of the conflict, the frequency of the acts of violence and military 
operations, the nature of the weapons used, displacement of civilians, territorial control by 
opposition forces, the number of victims (dead, wounded, displaced persons, etc.) are also 
pieces of information that needs to be taken into account.
94
 
 
As for the level of organization, it is essential for the non-governmental armed groups to have 
a minimum level of organization, meaning that these forces have to be under a certain 
command structure and have the capacity to maintain military operations. In this respect for 
example, the existence of an organizational chart indicating a command structure, the 
authority to launch operations bringing together different units, the ability to recruit and train 
new combatants or the existence of internal rule, might be the suggestive pieces of 
information  that need to be taken into consideration.
95
 In cases where these two conditions 
are not met, a situation of violence may not be described as non-international armed conflict 
but internal disturbances or internal tensions.
96
 
 
Whereas Common Article 3 applies to any armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring ―in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties‖, AP II applies only to 
armed conflicts ―which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
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responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.‖97 
Furthermore, Additional Protocol II provides that this Protocol ―shall not apply to situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.‖98 
 
On the other hand, the definition of non-international armed conflict in the Article 1 of the 
Additional Protocol II is more restrictive than the definition in the Common article 3, whereas 
the latter encompasses hostilities take place either between one or more armed group(s) and 
government forces or merely between armed groups, the former excludes the hostilities 
occurring only between non-State armed groups.
99
 
 
In the Tadic case the ICTY took the view that a non –international armed conflict exists 
where there exists ―protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State‖100 and that the ―international 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the 
cessation of hostilities until a peaceful settlement is achieved.‖101 This wider perspective by 
the ICTY made a significant contribution to the establishment of the definition of non-
international armed conflict in the sense of Common Article 3 as to include the hostilities 
where several groups fight each other in the absence of involvement of a governmental 
force.
102
 
 
In cases where the parties to the non-international armed conflict within the meaning of 
Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II continue their clashes on the territory of one 
or more third States, the nature of the armed conflict may not automatically change into an 
international armed conflict as long as there exists an explicit or tacit consent of the State 
concerned.
103
In that regard the distinctive character between international armed conflict and 
non- international armed conflict is not the territorial scope of the armed conflict rather the 
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parties involved.
104
 According to International Committee of Red Cross(ICRC), on the other 
hand, ―[a]s the four Geneva Conventions have universally been ratified now, the requirement 
that the armed conflict must occur "in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" 
has lost its importance in practice. Therefore, ―any armed conflict between governmental 
armed forces and armed groups or between such groups cannot but take place on the territory 
of one of the Parties to the Convention.‖105 
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4 HOW THE US JUSTIFIES ITS USE OF DRONE STRIKES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Since the inception of the US drone strikes and its wide range of use in different States‘ 
territories particularly outside the Afghanistan such as in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and 
elsewhere, there has been curious debate in the international law community as to the legal 
justification of the US for its drone operations. After encouraging initiatives by the UN and 
other relevant organizations for the United States to deliver a legal justification for its drone 
strikes, the US State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh addressed the American Society 
for International Law's Annual Meeting in March 2010 and used the opportunity to present 
the "considered view" of the Obama Administration in respect to US targeted  operations, 
particularly those carried out with drones.
106
 
 
The highlights of the speech can be summarized as follows: 
 
As a matter of international law, our […] operations rest on three legal 
foundations. First, we continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy that 
attacked us on September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake 
armed attacks against the United States. Second, in Afghanistan, we work as 
partners with a consenting host government. And third, the United Nations 
Security Council has, through a series of successive resolutions, authorized the 
use of “all necessary measures” by the NATO countries constituting the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to fulfill their mandate in 
Afghanistan… 
 
In the same way, in all of our operations involving the use of force, including 
those in the armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, … 
[w]hat I can say is that…U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations 
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable 
law, including the laws of war. 
 
The United States agrees that it must conform its actions to all applicable law. As 
I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an 
armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in 
response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its 
inherent right to self-defense under international law. As a matter of domestic 
law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force through 
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). These domestic 
andinternational legal authorities continue to this day. 
 
                                                          
106
 Vogel, Drone Warfare and The Law of Armed Conflict, 39 Denv. J. Int'l L. &Pol'y 101 2010-2011, 103 
29 
 
As recent events have shown, Al-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the 
United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in thisongoing armed 
conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the 
responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, 
including by targeting persons such as high-level Al-Qaeda leaders who are 
planning attacks. 
 
Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location 
will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to 
the imminence of the threat, the sovereigntyof the other States involved, and the 
willingness and ability of those States to suppress the threat the target poses…In 
U.S. operations against Al-Qaeda and its associated forces-- including lethal 
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles-- great care is 
taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that 
only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a 
minimum.
107
 [emphasis added] 
 
Although the Koh speech provides a detailed information on justification of the US for the use 
of drone strikes there remain many problematic areas which need to be explored. Hence, I will 
deconstruct the speech below in an effort to further discuss some of the aforementioned 
problematic areas. In fact, there are many contradictions in the speech. I will therefore discuss 
these contradictions related to self-defense and armed conflict in two sections. In the first 
section, I will firstly examine ‗the impact of international response to 9/11 on the law of self-
defense‘. Then I will look into the issue of ‗justification for drone strikes in relation to the 
right of self-defense‘. Lastly I will delve into the issue of ‗justification of drone strikes in pre-
emptive self-defense‘. In the second section I will first explore the justification of the US 
drone strikes via the notion of ‗Global War On Terrorism‘. I will then critique the US 
justification of the use of drone strikes on the basis of being an ‗ armed conflict with Al-
Qaeda, Taliban and associated forces‘. 
 
 
4.1 Self-Defense 
 
As touched upon above, the basis of the formulation of the legal justification for the use of 
drone strikes in the Koh speech includes some contradictory arguments. Whereas on the one 
hand, he claims that the US ―is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks‖, on the other hand, he relates that 
the US ―may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international 
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law.‖108 Professor O‘Connell rightly criticizes the formulation the justification in the speech 
as being ‗mutually contradictory‘. She points out that if the US is already in an armed conflict 
against Al-Qaeda, Taliban and associated forces as a result of armed attacks of 9/11, then the 
use of military force inclusive of drone strikes govern by the rules of IHL instead of the law 
of self-defense. In that case, it does not necessary to justify each attack as being in accordance 
with the law of self-defense.
109
 Despite this contradictory remark in the Koh speech, it is 
nevertheless obvious that the right of self-defense is one of the main arguments for the US 
authorities in an effort to legally justify the use of drone strikes in fighting against terrorism. 
Since the US justification basically relies on the assumption that the post 9/11 international 
response created a remarkable change on the law of self-defense in terms of the attacks by 
non-State actors in particular, the next section will analyze ‗the impact of international 
response to 9/11 on the law of self-defense‘ 
 
4.1.1 The Impact of the International Response to 9/11 on the Law of 
Self-Defense 
 
The importance of the debate over the scope of the right of self-defense has taken on a new 
significance and intensified following the terrorist attacks  on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11), especially as to the use of force in response 
to attacks by non-State actors. 
110
 In the attacks of 9/11 almost 3,000 people died, including 
the 227 civilians and 19 hijackers aboard the planes. It was the deadliest incident for 
firefighters and for law enforcement officers in the history of the United States, with 343 and 
72 killed respectively.
111
 Having considered the gravity of the attacks, the debate has been 
centralized on whether such a huge scale of an attack by non-State actors can amount to an 
‗armed attack‘ within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter so as to trigger the victim 
State‘s right of self-defense even in the absence of State involvement. Before delving into the 
discussion on this debate I will give a brief account of national and international response to 
the attacks of 9/11. 
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Immediately after the attacks the suspicion fell on the Al-Qaeda organization by the US 
authorities. In his letter to UN Security Council John D. Negroponte, on behalf of the US 
Government, claimed to ―has obtained clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda 
organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in 
the attacks.‖112 
 
On 12 September 2001, the US Congress issued a joint resolution (Authorization to Use 
Military Force-AUMF) in an attempt to authorize the President ―to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.‖113 
 
On the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution1368. In the preamble of the 
resolution, the Security Council, 
[d]eterminedto combat by all means threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts… Recognizing the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter,
114
 
 
the Security Council in the operative part; 
Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks 
which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and 
Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a 
threat to international peace and security;  
Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance 
with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.
115
 
 
In its subsequent Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001), the Security Council reaffirmed its 
express recognition as to ―the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.‖116 
According to Gray, it was a unique occasion that the Security Council, for the first time, ―had 
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implicitly recognized the right to use force in self-defense against terrorist action.‖117 
Although the Security Council, when condemning the terrorist attack in its Resolutions 1368 
and 1373, confirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, it has 
nevertheless avoided labeling the attacks as an ‗armed attack‘, rather preferred to characterize 
the attacks as a ―threat to international peace and security‖.118 
 
On the same day, the members of the NATO alliance, for the first time, invoked Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty according to which the parties conformed that ―an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.‖119 
 
On 21 September 2001 the Organization of American States-OAS adopted a resolution 
recognizing that the 9/11 attack was an attack ―against all American States and that in 
accordance with [Article 3 of] . . . the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 
Treaty) . . . , all States Parties . . . shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such 
attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American State ...‖120It is further 
declared by the resolution that ―the States Parties shall render additional assistance and 
support to the United States and to each other . . . to address the September 11 attacks, and 
also to prevent future terrorist acts‖121[emphasis added]. 
 
Based on these international and domestic authorities, the US launched the Operation 
Enduring Freedom in self-defense against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan on 7 
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October 2001, with a view to disrupting the use of the territory of Afghanistan by terrorists  as 
a base.
122
 
 
In fact, before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 there was no overwhelming line of argument as to 
whether the content of the Article 51 of the UN Charter can be expanded to cover the right to 
use force in self-defense against attacks by non-State actors (mainly by terrorist organization), 
rather the issue was a controversial one. However, the huge universal support by the 
international community for the US to exercise the right of self-defense in response to 9/11 
may be considered as raising the question whether there has been a remarkable change in the 
law of self-defense.
123
 
 
Although the Security Council avoided labelling the attacks as an ‗armed attack‘, it has been 
considered by some scholars [Dinstein, (2012); Müllerson, (2002); Blank, (2011—2012); 
Shaw, (2008)]  that the international response to the 9/11 attacks and the gravity of the attacks 
themselves clearly manifested that an armed attack that would trigger the right of self-defense 
within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter may be carried out by non-State actors 
regardless of the involvement of a State in the attack. Professor Gray, however, took the view 
that although the international response to the 9/11 indicates that under certain conditions 
there could be a right of self-defense against non-State actors, there exists some difficulties in 
establishing the exact scope of this right especially as to whether the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
have widened the notion of armed attack to cover acts by terrorist groups even in the absence 
of State involvement in the attack.
124
 Some other scholars [ O‘Connell, (2001—2002); Byers, 
(2002); Greenwood, (2002)], on the other hand, consider that State involvement in the attack 
is still an indispensable requirement so as to trigger the target State‘s right of self-defense and 
that without State involvement in the attack terrorist attacks would only be considered as a 
criminal law issue irrespective of the gravity of the attack in question.  
 
In fact, it is the most intricate part of the discussion whether the international response to 9/11 
can be construed as if an armed attack by non-State actors may trigger the right to use military 
force in self-defense even in the absence of State involvement. In order to emphasize the 
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impact of the reaction of the international community on the extent of the Article 51, 
Professor Dinstein States that, 
[n]otwithstanding some rearguard doctrinal adherence to the traditionalist 
approach, even those who regard as problematic the categorization of terrorist 
action qua an armed attack (within the meaning of Article 51) are compelled to 
concede that the response of the international community to 9/11 has left its mark 
on customary law.
125
 
 
With reference to the gravity of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 he further took the view that, 
[t]he fact that these acts amounted to an armed attack – laying the foundation for 
the exercise of self-defence pursuant to Article 51 – has been fully corroborated 
by a number of legal measures taken by international bodies […] in Resolution 
1368 (2001) […] the Security Council recognized and reaffirmed in this context 
‗the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter‘. Complaining that the Security Council refers to ‗horrifying terrorist 
attacks‘ – without mentioning specifically the expression ‗armed attack‘ – stands 
the argument on its head. If the right of self-defence can be actuated, this 
ineluctably implies that an armed attack is involved. The whole point about the 
contention that an armed attack did indeed take place on 9/11 is that this would 
warrant the exercise of the right of self-defence, a right recognized and reaffirmed 
by the Security Council in both resolutions.[…] The fact that terrorist attacks 
qualify as armed attacks means that they are subject to the full application of 
Article 51: no more and no less.
126
 
 
According to Müllerson, although the phrase in the Security Council Resolution 1373 is 
different from and runs short of one authorizing the use of all necessary means, its 
interpretation in specific circumstances may lead to the conclusion that ―notwithstanding their 
specific and even non-traditional features, terrorist attacks originating from abroad can still be 
qualified as armed attacks giving rise to the inherent right to self-defence.‖127 
 
Blank takes a similar line of argument and points out that there is no specific mention in 
Article 51 of the Charter stipulating that the right of self-defense can only be triggered in 
response to a threat or use of force by another State. Although the ICJ in a series of cases 
limited the sources of the ‗armed attack‘ to States, the issue of which type of actor can trigger 
the right of self-defense nevertheless remains controversial. However, regarding the States 
practice in the aftermath of 9/11 as firm support for the use of force in self-defense, he 
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deduces that there exists a right of self-defense against non-State actors even in the absence of 
any State involvement.
128
 
 
Shaw, by referring to the Security Council Resolutions, argues that ―[s]uch binding Security 
Council resolutions declaring international terrorism to be a threat to international peace and 
security with regard to which the right of self-defense is operative as such lead to the 
conclusion that large-scale attacks by non-State entities might amount to ‗armed attacks‘ 
within the meaning of article 51 without the necessity to attribute them to another State and 
thus justify the use of force in self-defense by those States so attacked.‖129 
 
O‘Connell, on the other hand, takes a more realistic stand and argues that, 
[t]he operative part of the Resolution […] does not authorize the use of armed 
force, nor does it explicitly authorize the United States to use armed force in self-
defense to the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, the Resolution does support 
the conclusion that the September 11 attacks were significant enough to trigger 
the right of self-defense, if the other conditions of legality are met.
130
 
 
For some other scholars the international response to the 9/11, particularly the Security 
Council resolutions, had no revolutionary change on the law of self-defense. Therefore the 
terrorist attacks in the absence of State involvement would be considered as a matter of 
criminal law. Byers in this regard, by pointing out the necessity of State sponsorship in the 
attack unleased by non-State entities considers that,  
[i]t will probably be argued that the atrocities of 11 September did not constitute 
an armed attack since they did not involve the use of force by a State, and that the 
relevant framework of analysis is instead international criminal law.
131
 
 
Greenwood, having the attention to an interesting point argues that the lawful exercise of the 
right of self-defense does not require any prior authority from the Security Council pursuant 
to Article 51 of the Charter. Hence, the references to the self-defense in the Resolutions 1368 
and 1373, although promoting the argument of the right of self-defense, had no bearing on the 
justification of the US for using military force in self-defense.
132
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As it can be clearly seen, the considerations over the debate of whether the international 
response as well as the States practice to the attacks of 9/11 has changed the conventional 
understanding of the right of self-defense considerably vary.  Whereas for some, the Security 
Council Resolutions authorize the US to use force in self-defense, for some others the 
Resolutions neither does authorize the US to exercise the right of self-defense nor does it 
justifies the use of force in self-defense by the US. Likewise, while the endorsement of the 
former approach may leads to the acceptance of a non-conventional concept of self-defense, 
conceding of the latter leads to the conclusion that the conventional understanding of the 
notion of self-defense is still in use. 
 
As a matter of fact, the huge divergence of the opinions on the same issue may be explained 
as follows: 
It has received international recognition that the US was the victim of horrible terrorist attacks 
of 9/11with thousands of deaths and casualties. These unforeseen huge-scale of armed attacks 
in the US soil along with its devastating aftermath effects have been broadcasted and had a  
shocking impact on the whole world which created an emotional eruption not only within the 
US but also worldwide. That‘s may be why, despite nothing exists in their mandate as such, 
the Security Council as well as NATO, for the first time in their history, recognized by 
implication the right of self-defense in response to attacks carried out by non-State actors, 
prior to a State exercised its right of self-defense.  
 
However, as professor Greenwood rightly underlined, in order for a State to use force in self-
defense within the ambit of the Article 51 of Charter, there exists no prior consent by the 
Security Council. By contrast, according to Article 51 ―measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter.‖133 In this regard, once the mandate of the Security Council comes into play 
as such, the exercise of the right of self-defense can no longer be in question vis-à-vis the 
conventional understanding of the Article 51of the Charter. From then on, it is the 
responsibility of the Security Council to authorize, when necessary, the use of military force 
which can no longer be deemed as the exercise of the right of self-defense, rather  as an action 
to maintain or restore international peace and security within the context of Chapter VII of the 
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UN Charter. Therefore, coming up with the conclusion that the international responses, 
mainly the Security Council Resolutions, have remarkably changed the conventional 
understanding of the concept of self-defense in a way to include the attacks by non-State 
actors as an ‗armed attack‘ triggering the right of self-defense would not be a realistic 
approach in the light of the Article 51 of the Charter.  
 
On the other hand, although still a controversial issue, it might be concluded that the State 
practices and the international support in response to 9/11 introduced a non-conventional 
understanding of the right of self-defense which lead to the conclusion that an attack by 
terrorist organizations, because of its seriousness and gravity, may amount to an ‗armed 
attack‘ within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter and thus trigger the victim State‘s right 
of self-defense. This is more clear and unproblematic where there is State involvement in the 
attack.  However, this conclusion embraces some complications in practice. Namely, if the 
victim State fails to obtain the consent of other sovereign State where the terrorists 
responsible for the attack take refuge to then the use of military force in self-defense against 
terrorist in the territory of that State would violate the prohibition of use of force under the 
Article 2(4) of the Charter against that sovereign State. This thorny issue, which will be 
examined in the following section, is of significant importance in terms of the US drone 
strikes against Al-Qaeda and its associates outside Afghanistan, such as in Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia and elsewhere. 
 
 
4.1.2 Justification For the Use of Force In Self Defense In Response to 
Attacks of 9/11 Against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (Operation 
Enduring Freedom) 
 
Since the US drone strikes constitute a significant part of the Operation Enduring Freedom 
this section will first examine the justification for the use of force in self-defense within the 
context of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and then delve into the issue of 
justification for the drone strikes in self-defense in response to ongoing attacks by Al Qaeda 
and associated forces on the US, its embassies, its military, and other USnationals abroad 
especially outside the Afghanistan such as in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. 
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Whereas some scholars consider that the Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan 
was within the ambit of the lawful self-defense for some others it was not. The divergence of 
the arguments are due to firstly the different interpretation of the international response to 
9/11 mainly the Security Council Resolutions, and secondly as a result of the discrepant 
assessment of the facts of the case. In other words, whereas some assume that the acting 
government of the Afghanistan was in one way or another involved in the attacks of 9/11, for 
some others although the acting government of the Afghanistan was may be responsible for 
State toleration or support, there was no State sponsorship which would lead to the conclusion 
that there was State involvement in the attack.For example, according to Paust, permissibility 
of lawful use of force against the Taliban, de facto government of Afghanistan, was ‗highly 
problematic‘ since whether the attacks of 9/11 by Al-Qaeda  was controlled by the Taliban  
has never been proven. In the absence of control that would result in State involvement, the 
mere tolerating, harboring, endorsing or financing of Al-Qaeda by the Taliban might only be 
resulted in State responsibility. Despite the this prejudice, he argues that use of military force 
against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was ―justified, and justifiable, as self-defense against 
ongoing process of armed attack on the United States, its embassies, its military, and other US 
nationals abroad.‖134 He further argues that, 
[n]either the Security Council nor NATO expected that there must be geographic 
or time limits that might condition permissibility of US measures of self-defense 
against al Qaeda, nor was there an expectation that measures of self-defense 
against al Qaeda in Afghanistan would require the consent of the Afghan 
government or the existence of an armed conflict with the United States.
135
 
 
On the contrary, Byers argues that the Security Council resolutions cannot be regarded as 
authorizing the US to use force in self-defense in response to attacks of 9/11 and presents the 
following reasoning: 
[Article 51 of  the Charter]stipulates that the right of self-defense exists ‗until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security‘. It could be argued that the adoption of Resolutions 1368 and 1373, 
rather than reinforcing the right of the US to engage in self-defense against 
Afghanistan, instead superseded that right. Both resolutions were adopted in direct 
response to the terrorist acts rather than pursuant to a US report of self-defense 
action, both were adopted under Chapter VII, and both call upon or require States 
to take a range of non-forceful measures to combat terrorism. They could thus be 
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seen as constituting ‗measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security‘.136 
 
O‘Connell, on the other hand, justifies the use of military force within the concept of the 
Operation Enduring Freedom on the grounds that the Taliban has established such close 
relationships with Al-Qaeda that it became responsible for its attacks. She further reckons that 
the US at the initial stage had ‗clear and convincing evidence‘ which explicitly manifested the 
responsibility of Afghanistan for both past and planned future attacks of Al-Qaeda.
137
 
 
Although having parallel views with Byers, Shah attaches attention to the following very 
important points which cannot be overlooked in order to fathom why the initiation of the use 
of military force within the context of Operation Enduring Freedom and its continuance 
cannot be considered as a lawful exercise of self-defense.  
 
Firstly, he rightly points to the fact that the Security Council Resolutions, although condemn 
the terrorist attacks in the strongest of the word, neither declare any involvement of the 
Afghanistan in the attacks, nor sanction any use of force against any State with a view to 
restoring international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. In addition to 
these shortcomings the Resolutions fall short of acknowledging any right to use force in 
response to the attacks of 9/11. 
 
Secondly, the actual link between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda has not been established 
concretely in a way that there was a State sponsorship by the Taliban in the attacks of 9/11. 
Even though the Taliban may be supported the Al-Qaeda during the attacks of 9/11, this can 
neither be regarded as ‗effective control‘ as enunciated in the Nicaragua, nor can it be 
regarded as ‗overall control‘ as pronounced in Tadic case. Likewise, even if the de facto 
government of Taliban continued to offer a safe haven to the members of Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and supported their ongoing attacks against the US and its allies, the Taliban 
nevertheless cannot be held responsible for the armed attacks that have already occurred in 
the absence of material involvement during their realization.  
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Lastly, he touches upon to the importance of the immediacy and the necessity requirements of 
the self-defense. Having considered the fact that the use of military force in Afghanistan 
initiated nearly four weeks after the attacks of 9/11, he notes that, 
[i]t is hard to fathom how Daniel Webster's formulation relating to the immediacy 
and necessity requirements of self-defense, under which a State is allowed to 
respond in legitimate self-defense only when the danger posed to it is ―instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moments for deliberation,‖ 
was met.
138
 
 
 
4.1.3 Justification For the Use of Drone Strikes in Self Defense Outside 
Afghanistan 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, although still a controversial issue, the use of drones inside 
Afghanistan might be considered as the use of force in an armed conflict situation which 
started as an international armed conflict along with the commencement of the Operation 
Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 and lasted until the fall of Taliban and then changed 
into non-international armed conflict upon the invitation of the new government in 2002 and 
still continue today. As mentioned it is not that a clear cut issue but a controversial one which 
falls outside of the scope of this paper. Therefore, leaving the debate on that issue on its head, 
I will examine the justification of the use of drones outside the so called ‗armed conflict‘ area 
of Afghanistan. 
Outside Afghanistan the use of drone strikes by the US commenced on 3 November 2002 
when a laser-guided Hellfire missiles hit a passenger vehicle in Yemen. Drone attacks in 
Pakistan began in 2004 and increased dramatically in 2008 and continued to climb in 2009.
139
 
As mentioned before the vast majority of drone strikes against Al Qaeda, Taliban and its 
associated forces conducted in the territory of Pakistan by the CIA. On the other hand, the US 
carried out its first drone strike in Somalia in 2007. As referred in Chapter II, the US runs two 
drone programs.
140
 Whereas in Afghanistan drone attacks are conducted by the US military, 
outside Afghanistan drone strikes run by the CIA as a covert operation targeting terror 
suspects around the world including Yemen, Somalia and mainly Pakistan. 
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With regard to justification for the use of drone strikes in self-defense outside Afghanistan, 
the US holds two different lines of argument. As a first claim, assuming the post 9/11 
responses as an authorization for the US to use force in self-defense, the US argues that the 
post 9/11 national and international authorizations to use force in self-defense against 
terrorists in response to armed attacks of 9/11 still continue in a way to justify drone strikes 
even today. As a second argument, the US claims that the use of drone strikes are carried out 
as a right of self-defense in response to ongoing armed attacks by Al-Qaeda and associated 
forces against the US and its allies. It needs to be borne in mind that there is no evidence in 
the US documents for the justification of drone strikes outside Afghanistan as being used in 
self-defense as both the continuation of the post 9/11 authorities or as in response to ongoing 
armed attacks. However, in the Koh speech there exist some implicit arguments which add up 
to the same meaning.  
 
With regard to the first argument, Koh brings forward that ―the United Nations Security 
Council has, through a series of successive resolutions, authorized the use of ‗all necessary 
measures‘‖ and that ―[t]hese […] international legal authorities continue to this day.‖141In 
addition to this ambiguous argument, in his article, Use of Unmanned System to Combat 
Terrorism,
142
 the US Naval War College Professor Raul A. Pedrozo makes great contributions 
in an effort to elaborate the Koh speech, on the one hand, and firmly endorses his line of 
argument with intent to justify the US drone strikes outside Afghanistan as the continuation of 
the 2001 authorities as well as the right of preemptive self-defense, on the other hand. His 
arguments regarding the preemptive self-defense will be presented in the following section in 
detail. With regard to the question of whether the post 9/11 ‗so called‘ authorizations remain 
viable until today, and whether they can be extended to apply terrorist acts against the US and 
its allies outside Afghanistan, Professor Pedrozo argues that, 
none of these organizations placed temporal or geographic restrictions on the use 
of force in self-defense. On the contrary, the opposite is true. Resolution 1368 
specifically decided that ―any act of international terrorism [is] …a threat to 
international peace and security‖ […] Moreover, the resolution expressed a 
readiness ―to take all necessary steps . . . to combat all forms of terrorism,‖ not 
just the 9/11 attack.
143
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Having considered the aforementioned discussion over the impact of the international 
response to 9/11 on the use of military force against terrorists in Afghanistan, it is hard to 
fathom how the US authorities rely their use of drone strikes on the right of self-defense as the 
continuation of the post 9/11 ‗so called‘ authorization. In fact, as O‘Connell, Greenwood, 
Byers and Shah rightly argued, the Security Council Resolutions fall short of either 
authorizing the US to use armed force in self-defense in response to attacks of 9/11, or 
sanctioning any use of force against any State with a view to restoring international peace and 
security under Chapter VII of the Charter, let alone to have a continuing effect to justify the 
use of drone strikes outside Afghanistan, even today. 
 
As for the second argument, this can be inferred by implication form the Koh speech that the 
use of drone strikes outside Afghanistan is justified as the use of force in self-defense in 
response to ongoing attacks by Al-Qaeda and its supporters. In his speech given nearly after a 
decade of 9/11, in 2010, Koh argued that, 
we continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on 
September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake armed attacks 
against the United States.
144
 [emphasis added] 
 
Given that the Security Council avoided labelling the large-scale of horrifying deadly terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 as ‗armed attack‘, it is hard to perceive how might the following attacks 
launched by Al-Qaeda and its associates against the US and its military constitute an ‗armed 
attack‘ in the absence of State involvement.  
 
Notwithstanding these unconvincing justifications, it nevertheless, needs to be comprehended 
that even assuming that the US is to use drone strikes in self-defense outside Afghanistan 
against attacks by non-State actors in the absence of State involvement, the following points 
of discussions arise. First of all, as mentioned above,  in order for the US to exercise lawful 
self-defense against members of Al-Qaeda in the territory of another State, the attacks should 
be attributable to that State. If there is no State involvement in the attacks, then the consent of 
the sovereign State where the terrorists responsible for the attacks take refuge to should be 
obtained so as to use drone strikes in self-defense against perpetrators in the territory of that 
State. Where the US failed to obtain the consent of the sovereign State, then the use of force 
in self-defense against terrorists in the territory of that State would violate the sovereignty of 
                                                          
144
Koh Speech, above note 3 
43 
 
that State as well as the prohibition of use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter. Although 
this is what the UN Charter stipulates, the scholars have quite various opinions and 
approaches concerning the US drone strikes outside Afghanistan. For example, O‘Connell 
touches upon the necessity of State involvement and the issue of State responsibility. She 
maintains that, 
[e]stablishing the need for taking defensive action can only justify fighting on the 
territory of another State if that State is responsible for the on-going attacks. It 
may well be that in a world of non-State actors, a group launching significant, on-
going armed attacks has no link to a State and so no State can be the target of 
defensive counter-attack. In those cases, measures other than self-defense on the 
territory of a State must be taken by the victim.
145
 
 
On the other hand, Orr by pointing the likelihood of the military-scale power of terrorist 
attacks opposing the jurisprudence of the ICJ, which limits the concept of self-defense to the 
armed attacks by State involvement, by virtue of its being unrealistic and unnatural vis-à-vis 
the Article 51 of the Charter. In this respect, his argument continues as follows: 
Al Qaeda's activities, of course, are not attributable to Pakistan even if Pakistan's 
intelligence service has turned a blind eye toward their operation.  Thus, the drone 
strikes against al Qaeda in Pakistan are only permissible as self-defensive force 
against a non-State actor. While the ICJ has famously held that acts constituting 
armed attacks must be ―by or on behalf of a State,‖ this reading of Article 51, is 
neither natural nor realistic. Read naturally, Article 51 permits the use of self-
defensive force in response to hostilities by non-State actors… In an era where 
non-State groups project military-scale power, the better view is that non-State 
actors, such as al Qaeda, can carry out armed attacks.
146
 
 
Despite Orr reckons that the activities of Al-Qaeda cannot be attributable to the Pakistan, he 
nevertheless holding the view that as long as a military-scale attacks unleashed by Al-Qaeda, 
the US can exercise its right of self defense against Al-Qaeda notwithstanding the Pakistani 
involvement in the attack. A similar line of argument is held by Barnidge who puts forth that, 
September 11 demonstrated that a State can suffer an ―armed attack‖ irrespective 
of whether such an attack can be attributed to another State and that the victim 
State can lawfully respond in self-defense on this basis. Since September 11, the 
ICJ has held that a victim State's response in self-defense requires prior State 
attribution, but this thinking was not without pointed disagreements on the bench" 
and has drawn criticism in the academic literature.
147
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Shah, on the other hand, draws the attentions to several points. He firstly points out the 
importance of State sovereignty by complaining about the evasive responses of the US 
authorities in response to use of drone strikes in Pakistan and argues that in the absence of the 
Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the only occasion that 
the US may unilaterally conduct a military operation on the territory of Pakistan without its 
consent is if the US is legitimately using its right of self-defense.
148
 
 
As a second point, he refers to the requirement of sponsorship by the Pakistan in the attacks of 
Al-Qaeda and provides the following considerations: 
By attacking non-State actors on Pakistani soil, however, the United States is 
carrying out armed attacks on Pakistan, which can only be defended if terrorist 
acts of such non-State actors residing in Pakistan qualify as armed attacks against 
the United States under article 51, and if Pakistan itself was guilty of sponsoring 
such terrorist activities. Such a level of State involvement is necessary as 
repeatedly indicated in I.C.J. judgments… In fact, even the level of support 
provided to such outfits by non-State actors of Pakistani origin located within 
Pakistan-such as Pakistani Taliban and tribal militias does not rise to the level of 
sponsorship that requires control of Al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban. It is, at 
most, a level of support that involves provision of weapons, logistics and safe 
haven. Such support under the Nicaragua and the Congo judgments is not the sort 
of assistance that would be enough to qualify as an ‗armed attack‘149 
 
In a rather different approach, McNab& Matthews draw attention to the law enforcement 
mechanism by holding the view that, 
under the law of self-defense a State's territorial integrity prevails unless the 
armed attack, which instigated the right to self-defense, is attributable to a foreign 
State. Only then may the victim State use force in self-defense in the sovereign 
territory of the foreign State. Should the non-State actor be located in the territory 
of a State that was not responsible for the armed attack, the victim State must rely 
solely on law enforcement methods governed by human rights.
150
 
 
As a last example, Paust, in an effort to justify the CIA killings of six person with drone 
strikes in Yemen in 2002, takes a rather unusual approach of self-defense and armed conflict 
paradigm and argues that, 
self-defensetargetingsand captures may occur "outside the geographical region of 
armed conflict" or "outside the area of hostilities," so long as there is strict 
compliance with general principles of necessity and proportionality that govern 
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the permissible use of lawful measures of self-defense… [L]awful measures of 
self-defense can occur outside of an actual theatre of war against those who are 
directly participating in an ongoing process of armed attacks against the United 
States and/or its embassies, military personnel, and other nationals abroad. For 
this reason, the self-defense paradigm is recognizably different from a war 
paradigm; the right of self-defense allows the targeting of persons wherever such 
forms of direct participation occur. Quite clearly, significant armed attacks or 
attempted armed attacks have emanated from parts of Yemen, thereby permitting 
self-defense targeting of direct participants in Yemen.
151
 
 
 
4.1.4 Justification For Drone Strikes as Pre-emptive Self Defense  
In contrast to above justification for drone strikes in self-defense on the grounds of the 
continuation of the 2001 authorities and of the ongoing attacks by Al-Qaeda, the preemptive 
self-defense argument, without specifically mentioning the use of drones, explicitly 
elaborated as a strategy for fighting against terrorism in the National Security Strategy 
documents (2002 and 2006) promulgated during the Bush Administration. The reason why the 
US promoted the doctrine of ‗preemptive self-defense‘ following the attacks of 9/11, in its 
official documents, is the proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Distraction-WMD (nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons) and their potential diffusion into the hands of terrorist 
organizations. This ominous contingency is delineated in the National Security Strategy 
(2002), which spell out that ―[w]e must be prepared to stop rogue States and their terrorist 
clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United 
States and our allies and friends.‖152 The means and methods of the counter terrorism effort 
against this threat, on the other hand, as it might be estimated, accentuated in a rather 
trenchant way in the document, which continuous as follows:  
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by […] using all the elements 
of national and international power and by identifying and destroying the threat 
before it reaches our borders.[…] we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to 
exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to 
prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.
153
[emphasis 
added] 
 
In an effort to elaborate the concept of preemptive self-defense (later called as ‗Bush doctrine 
of self-defense‘ by scholars), the following arguments are put forward in the document: 
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We cannot let our enemies strike first… We must adapt the concept of imminent 
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s adversaries. Rogue States and 
terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such 
attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of 
weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered 
covertly, and used without warning. The United States has long maintained the 
option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack. To forestall or 
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, 
act preemptively.‖154 [emphasis added] 
 
As clearly seen, whereas the document refers the necessity of the adoption of ‗concept of 
imminent threat‘, on the other hand, it articulates that so as to defend itself, the US would take 
anticipatory action against the threat even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy‟s attack. In fact, this is such a broader definition of the self-defense that the 
concept of preemptive self-defense, which might only be justified if there is an imminent 
threat, is fall far behind this concept. That‘s may be why this concept is called as Bush 
doctrine of self-defense so as to differentiate it from the concept that fall within the ambit of 
Caroline doctrine of preemptive self-defense.  
 
With regard to the National Security Strategy promulgated in 2006, although it emphasizes 
the importance of international diplomacy as an alternative to the use of military force, it is  
nevertheless obvious that the Bush Administration pursued the same doctrine of preemptive 
self-defense by the proclamation that ―[t]he place of preemption in our national security 
strategy remains the same‖and that ―we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack.‖155 Moreover, the 
use of military force appears to be confined to the counter terrorism efforts, rather than 
against rouge States. This is clearly elaborated in the similar acute way, which ststes that, 
[t]he hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed; they must be 
tracked down, killed, or captured. They must be cut off from the network of 
individuals and institutions on which they depend for support. That network must 
in turn be deterred, disrupted, and disabled by using a broad range of tools.
156
 
 
                                                          
154
 National Security Strategy-2002, above note 6, 15 
155
 The White House, The National Security Strategy of The United States of America, (March 2006), 23, 
available at: http://history.defense.gov/docs_nss.shtml  (20 May 2014), [hereinafter NSS -2006] 
156
 ibid,12 
47 
 
It is clear that the Bush Administration‘s comprehension of preemptive self-defense (known 
as ‗the Bush doctrine of self-defense‘) is rather separate from that of Daniel Webster‘s 
formulation of preemptive self-defense, the Caroline doctrine of self-defense. Whereas within 
the context of the latter, the use of force stipulates ―a necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation‖, the use of force 
in self-defense within the context of the former is an option even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy‟s attack. In this regard, the Bush doctrine of self-defense, 
which allows the use of force even in the absence of imminent threat, may be called as 
‗prerogative self-defense‘. 
 
As to the National Security Strategy promulgated in 2010 during Obama Administration, it is 
obvious that instead of placing the emphasis on the concept of preemptive self-defense, the 
new strategy document avoided any mentioning of preemption. Whereas the previous strategy 
was to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by using all the elements of national and 
international power by acting preemptively, the newer formulation of the strategy is ―to 
disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that 
protects our homeland, secures the world‘s most dangerous weapons and material, denies Al-
Qaeda safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the 
world.‖157 Only the strategy of ‗Deny Safe Havens and Strengthen At-Risk States‘ includes an 
implicit reference to the notion of preemptive action which continues as follows: 
Wherever Al-Qaeda or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven—as 
they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel—we will meet them 
with growing pressure. We also will strengthen our own network of partners to 
disable Al-Qaeda‘s financial, human, and planning networks; disrupt terrorist 
operations before they mature; and address potential safe-havens before Al-Qaeda 
and its terrorist affiliates can take root.
158
 [emphasis added] 
 
Despite the Obama Administration‘s lenient pronunciation on the strategy of countering 
terrorism, the fact that the use of drone strikes, particularly outside Afghanistan, has 
dramatically increased during Obama Administration, egregiously manifests that the Obama 
Administration‘s practice tantamount to the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defense which 
crystalized in the phrase ‗we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack‟. 
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In parallel to this, in his abovementioned speech, Koh has also avoided giving explicit 
reference  the notion of preemptive self-defense. Instead, he referred by implication to this 
notion stating that, 
we continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on 
September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake armed attacks 
against the United States… As recent events have shown, Al-Qaeda has not 
abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack 
us… [W]hether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will 
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat…159 
 
In a rather similar approach with the Bush Administration, Professor Pedrozo firmly 
advocates the preemptive self-defense in the presence of imminent threat. In fact, as a war 
college Professor, Pedrozo reflects the real reasoning of the US justification for the use of 
drone strikes in fighting against terrorism under the concept of ‗preemptive self-defense‘ in 
response to imminent threat being posed by Al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. In this sense, 
he opines that ―it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter if a nation was 
required to absorb a first strike, e.g., another 9/11 or a weapon of mass destruction attack, 
before taking necessary and proportionate military measures to prevent an imminent attack by 
an armed aggressor.‖160 The determination of imminence of an attack, according to him, 
requires ―an assessment of all facts and circumstances known at the time –real-time 
intelligence, heightened political tensions, previous and current threats by the aggressor, 
pattern of aggression/attacks, stated intentions of the aggressor, etc.‖161 In order to qualify 
whether the ongoing activities of Al-Qaeda and its supporters continue to pose an imminent 
threat to the US and its allies, one should examine past and current acts of aggression 
committed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates against the US and its allies, he reckons. After 
making a long list of past and present acts of aggression by Al-Qaeda and its allies
162
Pedrozo, 
assumes that, 
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despite the substantial progress that has been made toward eliminating the threat 
posed by terrorists, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a potent and determined 
force with the capability and intent to strike the US mainland, its allies and US 
interests abroad at every opportunity with the most destructive means at their 
disposal. The militant groups continue to train and equip their fighting forces in 
order to plan and execute devastating attacks against the United States and its 
allies around the world.  
 
After reaching to the conclusion that the acts of aggression committed by Al-Qaeda and 
its supporters pose an imminent threat, he argues that, 
[u]nderthese circumstances, international law allows the United States to 
preemptively use proportionate force in self-defense to eliminate the continuing 
and imminent threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups… Until the 
threat is effectively eliminated, the United States can continue to use force in self-
defense against Al-Qaeda and its supporters, to include the use of unmanned 
systems.
163
 
 
In the same vein, Mullerson points out the ineffectiveness of the interceptive measures vis-à-
vis the potentiality of irretrievable terrorist attacks that are of devastating effects. In this 
respect, he takes the view that, 
today and in the context of self-defense against terrorist attacks (especially if the 
latter have access to WMD), I believe, preventive or anticipatory measures are 
justified. As terrorism is usually a continuous process being carried out in the 
murky underworld, it would be too late or risky to rely only on the interception of 
individual attacks that have already been irrevocably launched without attempting 
to destroy terrorist bases, supply lines, training camps and other similar 
facilities.
164
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
December2009 failed ―underwear bomber‖ attack and the May 2010 failed bombing in Times Square—been 
successful. It is clear from these incidents that Al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent threat to the United 
States and its allies and continues to threaten large-scale attacks against the United States and US interests. For 
instance,[…] in June2009, Al-Jazeera television broadcast a message from bin Laden that threatened Americans 
with revenge for supporting Pakistan‘s military offensive to expel the Taliban from Swat Valley. Six months 
later, a Nigerian man […] with links to Al-Qaeda attempted to ignite an explosive device on board a Northwest 
Airlines flight with 278 passengers on board as the plane prepared to land in Detroit on Christmas day. 
Fortunately, the device failed to ignite, but bin Laden nevertheless claimed responsibility for the attempted 
bombing… An attack on the [US embassy in Yemen] in 2008 had killed nineteen, including an eighteen-year-old 
American woman… ―[B]etween 100 and 150 Westerners are believed to have traveled to the [Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas] FATA in 2009‖ to train with Taliban militants. Arguably, these new recruits will be 
able to move around the United States and Europe more easily and be more difficult to detect than traditional 
foreign operatives. 
There is also growing evidence that Al-Qaeda‘s anti-American/anti-Western ideology has been adopted by a 
number of Islamist extremist groups in Europe and North America... In June 2010, a federal grand jury in 
Houston indicted Barry Walter Bujol, a US citizen from Hempstead, Texas, for attempting to provide material 
support to Al-Qaeda, including personnel, money, prepaid phone cards, SIM cards, global positioning systems, 
cell phones and restricted publications on the effects of US military weapons (e.g., US) in Afghanistan. On the 
same day, an Ohio couple from Toledo, […] dual US-Lebanese citizens, were arrested for conspiring to provide 
material support to Hezbollah…‖ 
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As discussed in previous chapter, academic opinions over the notion of preemptive self-
defense are quite diverse. While some argue that there exists no right of self-defense until an 
armed attack has actually started, some others argue that there is a right of preemptive self-
defense against an imminent armed attack. On the other hand, Dinstein, who rejects 
preemptive self-defense, brings forward that there is a right of "interceptive self-defense", 
where a State has "committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way", an 
approach that differs but little from that in the Caroline case.  
 
In a rather similar approach with the proponents of preemptive self-defense, Professor 
Greenwood holds that the position of the Judge Higgins cannot be overlooked, who argues 
that, 
in a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous 
provision in a text in a way that requires a State passively to accept its fate before 
it can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also 
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right of self-defence. It 
is the potentially devastating consequences of prohibiting self-defence unless an 
armed attack has already occurred that leads one to prefer this interpretation-
although it has to be said that, as a matter of simple construction of the words 
alone, another conclusion might be reached.
165
 
 
From his point of view, considering the realities of the contemporary military situations, the 
Judge Higgins approach, better exemplifies the State‘s needs in practice than the more 
restrictive interpretation of Article 51, which confines the right of self-defense to cases in 
which an armed attack had already occurred. He, nevertheless, emphasizes the fat that the 
preemptive self-defense should be confined to instances where the armed attack is 
imminent.
166
 
 
Obviously, the Bush doctrine of self-defense has not received recognition from international 
lawyers, even from American scholars. Therefore, the proponents of the US use of drone 
strikes on the basis of preemptive self-defense, justify their arguments in an effort to manifest 
that there exists an imminent threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates against the US and its 
allies. Ironically, in the determination of the presence of an imminent threat, instead of 
revealing that drone strikes are carried out against a particular individual who posed an 
imminent threat within the concept of a specific incident, they reach to this conclusion by the 
assessment of past and present acts of aggression by Al-Qaeda on a cumulative basis. In 
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effect, this approach fall short of the Webster‘s formulation of preemptive self-defense, but 
rather represents the Bush doctrine of ‗prerogative self-defense‘ which allows the use of drone 
strikes against a target even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s 
attack.  
 
For this reason, although the use of force in preemptive self-defense might be considered as 
lawful self-defense on condition of presence of an imminent threat, the US drone strikes has 
been strongly criticized for the following reasons. 
 
First, the use of drone strikes is criticized as being in compatible with the requirement of 
lawful self-defense, mainly in  the absence of imminent threat. In this regard Shah reckons 
that the use of drone strikes, which are primarily preemptive in nature, fall short of being 
carried out on the basis of preemptive self-defense in the presence of imminent threat. In this 
regard, he considers that for purposes of immediacy and necessity, the Daniel Webster 
formulation which requires an instant and overwhelming danger leaving no choice of means 
or moments of deliberation is not the case for the US drone strikes. By contrast, the US drone 
strikes in Pakistan are carried out on the basis of ‗intensive intelligence gathering and 
deliberation‘ that last for years. Therefore, he reckons that there is no instant or overwhelming 
danger posed by the targeted individuals to the US as long as it does not conduct such attacks. 
In a rather opposite approach with the proponents of use of drone strikes, he argues that, 
These attacks are in fact preemptive strikes that aim to weaken Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban in the long-term by neutralizing their leadership, and thus, are just one of 
the many measures that the United States undertakes to achieve its inchoate long-
term objectives that have little to do with self-defense as recognized under 
international law. This determination is further evinced from the presence of the 
controversial Bush Doctrine and the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, both of 
which disregard principles of international law constraining the use of force.‖167 
 
Second, it is claimed that the US is targeting against wrong groups who do not pose threat 
against the US and that the US drone strikes are carried out in an attempt to kill senior 
members of   Al-Qaeda and Taliban as well as local tribal leaders in Pakistan with a view to 
exterminating their leadership so as to eradicate these networks and thereby, prevent future 
terrorist attacks.
168
  Shah argues that, besides Al-Qaeda, there are three different groups in the 
region (Afghani Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and local tribal militia leaders in Pakistan) with 
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different agenda.  All these groups are considered as terrorists by the US and are being 
targeted by the use of drone strikes. He observes that: 
Attacks on Afghani Taliban are carried out to neutralize its leadership, which the 
United States claims commands and controls insurgents fighting against U.S. 
forces across the border in Afghanistan. The United States also claims that these 
commanders often cross back into Afghanistan to engage in hostile operations 
against U.S. forces. Local tribal militia leaders in Pakistan and Pakistani Taliban 
commanders are principally targeted by U.S. drones because of the logistical, 
weapon supply, and safe haven support they provide to the other two groups. The 
United States classifies all of the groups as terrorists and thus within the purview 
of its global War on Terror. In reality, however, those targeted have very different 
agendas and modes of operation, albeit with some overlap at times… Taliban 
insurgents ostensibly see this as a war of liberation against an unlawful occupation 
of their country, [...] the fighting between U.S. forces and Taliban insurgents 
involves Taliban responding to preemptive and proactive attacks initiated by U.S. 
forces. In light of these facts, it is hard to see how the Taliban actions against U.S. 
forces could be classified as acts of terrorism against the United States, especially 
when, unlike September 11, no attacks are conducted on U.S. soil or against U.S. 
civilians, but are instead against U.S. forces during active combat operations. 
Consequently, the only group left that the United States might argue for attacking 
on the basis of preemptive self-defense against terrorism aimed at itself, is 
genuine Al-Qaeda membership residing in Pakistan.
169
 
 
This argument is also supported by the Columbia Human Rights Clinic Report issued in 2012, 
according to which the military and the CIA carry out drone operations within the context of 
two concepts: ‗personality strikes‘ and ‗signature strikes‘. Whereas under the concept of 
‗personality strikes‘ the US target individuals whose identity is known, within the concept of 
‗signature strikes‘ the US conduct targeting without knowing the exact identity of the 
individuals. In the concept of latter, the persons match ―a pre-identified ‗signature‘ of 
behavior that the US links to militant activity or association‖.170 
 
According to the report, the majority of the drone strikes in Pakistan have been carried out 
within the concept of signature strike in a cover operation. The report further informs that the 
US has killed ―twice as many ‗wanted terrorists‘ in signature strikes than in personality 
strikes‖ and that ―most of the people on the CIA‘s ‗kill list‘ have been killed in signature 
strikes‖ according to intelligence provided by an unnamed US official in 2011.171 
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The US targeted killings of members of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates with drone strikes outside 
Afghanistan, either in the context of ‗personality strikes‘ or ‗signature strikes‘  are carried out 
in accordance with a ‗kill list‘. The number of individual on these kill lists, and the process of 
adding new names to a kill list reportedly vary for CIA and military targets, and continues to 
evolve over the course of time.
172
 
 
The White House‘s involvement in targeting decisions, according to the report, has increased 
during the Obama Administration. In this sense, the report suggest that: 
The President reportedly personally approves every military target in Yemen and 
Somalia, but reviews only about a third of the CIA‘s targets in Pakistan—those 
that seem particularly controversial. Little has been reported on the CIA‘s target 
selection procedures, which have been described as ―insular… A more recent 
account States that targets are added to the kill list by a Covert Action Review 
Group, made up of high-ranking CIA staff, and then sent on to the CIA‘s 
Counterterrorism Center, which directs the strikes… 
  
The ―kill list‖ is not the only way the US targets individuals using drones. A 
significant proportion of the individuals killed in drone strikes are not, by even the 
US government‘s account, militant leaders and thus are unlikely to be on the ―kill 
list.‖ According to one media account, a White House evaluation of drone strikes 
in summer 2011 found that ―the CIA was primarily killing low-level militants.‖ 
Similarly, a 2011 New America Foundation report found that just one out of every 
seven drone attacks in Pakistan kills a ―militant leader.‖ A Reuters study found 
that more than 90 percent of the estimated 500 individuals killed in drone strikes 
in Pakistan were ―lower-level fighters,‖ based on an analysis of data provided 
by unnamed US officials in May 2010.
173
 
 
 
Leaving the reliability of this report and the credibility of the information provided by the 
sources in the report aside, one would suggest that the fact that the US drone strikes has been 
carried out and is still being carried out in a covert operation, cast substantial doubt on the 
justifiability of the use of drone strikes in self-defense on the grounds of preemption against 
an imminent threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its supporters.   
 
Third, even if one were to assume that the way in which the US carry out its drone strikes in a 
way to compatible with the requirements of the lawful self-defense, the US is nonetheless has 
to comply with the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality 
under the Caroline paradigm.  
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With regard to the necessity requirement, Blank considers that the necessity prong of self-
defense paradigm, which plays a substantial role in concept of effective counterterrorism, 
composed of two main components: imminence and alternatives. For the purpose of former, 
he observes that in the terrorism paradigm the threat posed by terrorists must be imminent in a 
way that posing a clear and present threat to the civilians unless it is eliminated. Therefore the 
threat must not be ―an amorphous threat, distant in time; quite the opposite for it indicates that 
unless specific measures are taken with respect to the person posing the threat harm will befall 
those not in a  position to protect themselves‖.174 He brings forward the following criteria in 
the assessment of the imminent threat posed by terrorists as an example: 
(1) the intent of the terrorist group and the probability of attack (have they made 
clear their determination to attack and is there reliable intelligence to suggest they 
are planning to attack?); (2) capacity (what is their capacity to attack .. . ?); (3) 
methods of attack (terrorists use deception and stealth and there will likely be no 
advance warning; thus waiting until an attack is underway will be too late for 
effective self-defense); (4) gravity of likely harm (given what is known about the 
terrorists' intent and capacity, what is the likely harm expected from an attack?); 
and (5) urgency of the threat (is there good reason to believe that the likelihood of 
attack is increasing, and that acting now is critical to thwarting an attack?).
175
 
 
 
As for the latter, the component of alternatives, he suggests that ―there must be no alternatives 
to the use of force as a means to deter or repel the threat posed by such individual‖. He further 
considers that, 
ifthe State has the option or ability to detain the individual (or seek his arrest by 
the territorial State's authorities) or otherwise thwart the attack, then the necessity 
prong will not be satisfied. Thus, as many scholars posit, "the targeting of 
suspected terrorists must be restricted to cases in which there is credible evidence 
that the targeted persons are actively involved in planning or preparing further 
terrorist attacks against the victim State and no other operational means of 
stopping those attacks are available."
176
 
 
 
As pointed out by Blank, the issue of evidence in relation to the right of self-defense against 
an imminent threat is highly important in that it is open for abuses. 
 
O‘Connell, in this respect, takes the view that,  
[u]nlike the case where no armed attack has yet occurred, the State, already a 
victim, may use self-defense even if the next attacks are not yet underway. The 
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defending State need only show by clear and convincing evidence that future 
attacks are planned.
177
 
 
 
In effect, neither international law has accepted law of evidence nor the ICJ has established 
such rules of evidence, but for the latter has occasionally referred to a standard of evidence 
which elaborates ―proof may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no 
room for reasonable doubt.‖178 
 
She further notes that the standard of clear and convincing evidence is also accepted by 
prominent scholars that in case of resort to military force against terrorist attacks. For 
example, whereas Greenwood makes reference to ‗sufficiently convincing‘ standard, Lobel 
refers to the standard of ‗stringent‘ evidence:   
Given the potential for abuse of the right of national self-defense, international 
law must require that a nation meet a clear and stringent evidentiary standard 
designed to assure the world community that an ongoing terrorist attack is in fact 
occurring before the attacked nation responds with force. Such a principle is the 
clear import of the International Court of Justice's decision in Nicaragua v. United 
States. 
 
Henkin, as well, finds that international law "recognize[s] the exception of self-
defense in emergency, but limit[s it] to actual armed attack, which is clear, 
unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation or 
fabrication.
179
 
 
 
According to O‘Connell the US authorities invariably make reference to either "convincing" 
or "compelling" evidence before resort to use military force in response to terrorist attack. For 
example, when the US launched bombing raids against the training camps in Afghanistan of 
Osama bin Laden and a factory in Sudan, in response to embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998, the then President alleged that, 
theUS targets were a terrorist base in Afghanistan and a chemical weapons facility 
in Sudan. We have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in the 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.... We have compelling information 
that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and 
others.
180
 
 
                                                          
177
 O‘Connell, above note 83, 894—895  
178
 Ibid, 895—896  
179
 İbid, 898 
180
 İbid, 897 
56 
 
In its report to the Security Council, the US argued that the attacks had been within the 
context of self-defense. However, in the following days, when several governments and arms 
control experts questioned the value of the evidence that linking the factory to bin Laden and 
to the production of chemical weapons it became evident that the evidence was not clear and 
convincing. Therefore the US was criticized by the international society for the use of military 
force based on inadequate evidence.
181
 
 
Another argument as regards the principle of necessity propounded by Shah is that resort to 
use of drone strikes by the US is unnecessary in that it exacerbate the threat of terrorism not 
only from regional perspective but from global perspective as well. He explains why: 
U.S. drone attacks have given birth to an unprecedented level of resentment and 
anger among the tribal populace], and they have provided impetus to extremist 
recruitment and bolstered the resolve of militants. The resulting aggressiveness is 
apparent from recent terrorist attacks conducted by extremists in secure 
metropolises of Pakistan distant from the tribal areas, as retribution for the drone 
attacks. For instance, BaitullahMehsud, the deceased leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban, 
the umbrella organization of all Pakistani Taliban outfits, had threatened that his 
fighters would continue to undertake terrorist attacks in secure parts of Pakistan 
on a weekly basis as reprisal for the continuing drone attacks. This proxy fight 
between the United States and the militants within Pakistan is dangerously 
destabilizing the country and increasing the dangers of international terrorism to 
all nations, including the United States. Therefore, the necessity of the drone 
attacks for eliminating the threat of terrorism emanating out of the tribal areas of 
Pakistan is highly questionable.
182
 
 
On the other hand, the use of drone strikes is criticized by one of proponents of the US 
Operation Enduring Freedom, O‘Connell, who argues that,    
members of Al Qaeda are known to be plotting to attack the United States so 
killing them wherever they are is an act of preemptive self-defense. This argument 
is completely antithetical of the law of self-defense. The law of self-defense does 
not permit States to attack before they possess evidence of an armed attack 
occurring—evidence of plots does not suffice. Moreover, this law does not permit 
attacks on individuals and small groups lacking State sponsorship even if they are 
carrying out actual attacks. Even where the U.S. may have permission from 
Pakistan and is engaging in hostilities along with the authorities of that State, 
counter-terrorism experts have raised real concerns about the wisdom of drone 
strikes. Whether attacking with drones is wise, leads us to question the necessity 
and proportionality of resorting to this sort of military force. Counter-terrorism 
experts have told us that our drone attacks are actually fueling interest in the 
insurgency in Afghanistan and in Pakistan and in taking lethal action against the 
government of Pakistan. As for proportionality, we know the CIA is working from 
a ―kill list.‖ Most strikes are associated with one person‘s name. Yet, every strike 
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kills a number of persons. It is difficult to make the argument that killing 30, 12, 
or even six persons is proportional in the killing of one person. So in conclusion, 
we see that U.S. use of drones is failing the relevant tests of the lawful use of 
force. It is failing under Article 51; failing under the principle of necessity and 
failing under the principle of proportionality.
183
 
 
As for the proportionality requirement, Shah asserts that the use of drone strikes is 
incompatible with the principle of proportionality for several reasons. First, he reckons that 
drone strikes are far from achieving the US objective, which is to eliminate the actual threat of 
aggression posed by terrorists, and thereby contradictory vis-à-vis the rule of proportionality. 
Second, he argues that drone strikes caused extensive number of civilian deaths and injuries 
as well as unnecessary destruction of infrastructure. According to him, this undesirable 
outcome comes into existence due to the use of remotely controlled unmanned aircrafts whose 
strikes are determined by intelligence, which are generally proven faulty, and whose 
capability of distinguish civilians and militant targets at the time of a strike especially when 
the targets are in the vicinity of civilians is highly questionable compared to the aircrafts with 
pilots. In his observation: 
This explains why ―between January 14, 2006 and April 8, 2009, only 10 [strikes] 
were able to hit their actual targets, killing 14 wanted Al-Qaeda leaders, besides 
perishing 687 innocent Pakistani civilians. The success percentage of the U.S. 
Predator strikes thus comes to not more than six per cent.‖184 
 
Another highly significant issue with regard to the principle of proportionality is that unlike 
the jus in bello principle of proportionality, there is no such collateral damage permissible in 
the jus ad bellum proportionality per se. 
 
In the light of above considerations, the following observations may be concluded. First, even 
the Webster formulation has received a high level of recognition; there are still some debates 
over the use of force in self-defense against an imminent threat. Second, notwithstanding the 
controversy over the legality of preemptive self-defense in case of an imminent threat, when 
justifying the use of drone strikes, the US instead of providing convincing evidence that the 
particular target posed an imminent threat of attack, it relies on the presupposition that every 
members of Al-Qaeda and its supporters are potential threat of an armed attack at any time at 
anywhere, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack. This 
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approach which might be considered as ‗prerogative self-defense‘, manifests the Bush 
Administration‘s demeanor towards the use of force in self-defense against terrorists and 
represents the ground of the Obama Administration‘s extensive number of drone strikes in 
self-defense when killing the members of Al-Qaeda and Taliban as well as tribal leaders. 
Therefore, the use of drone strikes on this ground cannot be justified under international law 
of self-defense. Third, even assuming that the US has the right to use force within the context 
of Bush doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, killing members of different groups with 
different aims  who has no intention of posing threat of attack against the US, such as tribal 
leaders etc., cannot be justified under the necessity requirement of the right of self-defense.  
Last but not least, even assuming that all those groups can be regarded as posing threat of 
attack against the US, drone strikes cannot be justified due to the impermissibility of collateral 
damage for the jus ad bellum proportionality. 
 
 
4.2 Armed Conflict  
 
The other justifying argument of the US for the use of drone strikes is that the US is in an 
armed conflict with terrorism and therefore may use lethal force against members of terrorist 
groups who are belligerent and thus lawful targets under international law. In fact, the US 
officials did not use the term ―armed conflict‖ during the Bush Administration, instead they 
preferred the rhetoric of ―Global War Against Terrorism‖. However, since the use of the term 
―war‖ abandoned following the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and changed 
into the term ―armed conflict‖, this argument can be examined under the issue of armed 
conflict as such.  
 
Although the Bush administration declared a global war against terrorism, when it comes to 
the applicable law to the conflict between the US and terrorists, the US authorities alleged 
some contradictory remarks. Whereas they claim that the conflict between the US and 
terrorists is not an international armed conflict since the terrorists, mainly Al-Qaeda and its 
associates, are not a State party to the Geneva Conventions, they also claim that it was not a  
non-international armed conflict since it exceeded the territory of one State, rather it is an 
international armed conflict in character. In fact, in the White House Memorandum, President 
Bush declared that ―common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban 
59 
 
detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and 
common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character‖. However 
he also declares that ―none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not 
a High Contracting Party to Geneva‖.185 
 
This contradictory line of argument was also examined by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld in 2006 which disagreed with the argument of the Bush Administration that the 
conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda was a ‗global war on terror‘ which cannot be 
ruled by the Geneva Conventions. The Court rather considered the conflict as non-
international armed conflict. After the observation of the Supreme Court on the issue, the US 
took the view that the conflict can be characterized as non-international armed conflict during 
the Obama Administration which has slightly changed that rhetoric of the global war on terror 
and adopted that the US is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks.  
 
 
During the Bush and Administration, officials have made arguments that since the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 were remarkable and were preceded and succeeded by terrorist attacks, the US 
may target and kill al Qaeda members and their affiliates wherever they are found. After the 
first drone strike outside Afghanistan of 2002 in Yemen, the National Security Advisor, 
Condoleezza Rice, told to the press that the US is permitted to use military force on the 
ground that the US is in ―a new kind of war.‖186 According to the US officials, the battlefield 
of this new war is not where fighting was occurring but where certain individuals were found. 
In this regard the Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs of the Department of 
Defense maintained that the US could target al Qaeda and other international terrorists around 
the world and those who support them without warning.
187
 The officials of the Obama 
Administration, on the other hand, made the enemy more explicit by pronouncing that the US 
is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces. These 
two different manners of approaching will be examined separately in this section in an effort 
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to propound whether the justification of the US for drone strikes on the basis of armed 
conflict can be justified under international law.  
 
 
4.2.1 Global War On Terrorism 
 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 President George W. Bush pronounced that ―our war on 
terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. This war will be 
fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.‖188 He also Stated that ―[o]ur enemy is a 
radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror 
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.‖189 It is clear that the US justification for 
the use of military force against terrorists, inclusive of use of drone strikes, was declared in 
the first days after 9/11attacks by the then President George W. Bush who declared the whole 
world as a war zone. Within the context of this expansive approach, the war has no 
geographic constraints, and the battlefield is of a global nature. In other words, the war 
follows the terrorist enemies and an individual suspected of being an Al Qaeda member may 
be killed by CIA agents anywhere in the world at any time using UAVs.
190
 
 
The legal justification for this proclamation  of global war on terror made by the Deputy 
National Security Adviser Stephan Hadley, who expressed that the legal basis was the attacks 
of 9/11 on the US soil which was conceived by the American people as ―an act of war.‖191 
Moreover, Professor Ruth Wedgwood, Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, argued that in 
addition to the acts of war on 9/11  ―Al-Qaeda has declared jihad against the United States, 
and in fatwa after fatwa, Osama bin Laden has announced that all Americans are valid 
targets.‖192 The US Justice Department has similarly contested before the US courts that the 
country is in a global war on terror. Professor John Yoo, a member of the Justice Department 
and one of a mastermind of the ‗global war‘ argument, in one occasion, analyzed the US 
Supreme Court decisions and concluded that "the Court agreed that the US is at war against 
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the al Qaeda terrorist network and that it is allowed to ―use all of the tools of war to fight a 
new kind of enemy...‖.193 
 
After the CIA killing with drone of six men traveling in a vehicle in Yemen in 2002, the 
Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense for International Affairs, Charles 
Allen, argued that since the US is at war with Al Qaeda and its associates, the killings were 
lawful. That‘s to say, the war attaches to the individuals, not the situations, therefore it would 
be lawful to kill an Al Qaeda suspect ―on the streets of a peaceful city like Hamburg, 
Germany without warning‖.194  Although the justification of the use of force via the notion of 
global war on terrorism has not been countered by the international lawyers until 2003, it 
nevertheless found no support from independent scholars as well as judicial authorities.
195
 In 
that sense, it is obvious that the notion of global war against terrorism carries a similar pattern 
with the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defense, in a way that it confers the US the right to 
use military force in counterterrorism effort in a privileged way vis-à-vis the international 
law. In this regard, whereas the latter justifies the use of drone strikes in the absence of 
imminent threat, the former justifies killings with drones in the absence of actual hostilities. 
Indeed, these approaches of the Bush Administration were ardently criticized even by the US 
scholars. For example, Barnidge denounces the manner of approaching of the Bush 
Administration to these kinds of thorny issues as being ―cowboy diplomacy‖196 
 
With regard to the judicial demeanor towards the notion of global war on terror, in its Wall 
Advisory Opinion (9 July 2004), as to the legal consequences of Israel constructing a security 
barrier on occupied Palestinian territory, the ICJ undermined the possibility of declaring war 
against terrorism. The Court noted that, 
the construction of the wall constitutes action not in conformity with various 
international legal obligations incumbent upon Israel. However, […] according to 
Israel: ―the construction of the Barrier is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, its inherent right to self-defence and Security Council 
resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001)‖197 
 
 
Referring to the Article 51 of the Charter the Court concludes that, 
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Article 51 of the Charter […] recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-
defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, 
Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.
198
 
 
According to O‘Connell, the dictum of the ICJ means that ―the right to use armed force is 
connected with territory –facts of fighting on the ground, not the presence of an individual 
suspected of being a terrorist.‖199 
 
As for the opinion of scholars, O‘Connell draws attention to several important points. First, 
Whether the U.S. was in fact in a war after September 11 depends on the 
definition of war in international law… The term "war" fell out of use as a legal 
term of art with the adoption of the Charter in 1945. The Charter in Article 2(4) 
prohibits all uses of force, war and lesser actions, except in self-defense or as 
mandated by the Security Council. Following the adoption of the Charter, treaties 
relevant to war, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 substituted the term 
"armed conflict" for war… We still use the term "war" to refer to any serious 
armed conflict. Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sudan and Sri Lanka experienced civil war in 
the 1990s… The war on drugs does involve the military, but it is not an armed 
conflict against drugs…  
 
When President Bush first declared war on terrorism, many thought he was using 
the term war in the sense of the war on drugs… But […] the Administration has 
acted as though the US is actually involved in armed conflict against terrorists 
everywhere. An armed conflict, however, has two important components. It 
consists of two or more armed groups engaged in armed hostilities. In Prosecutor 
v. Tadic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
Tribunal defined "armed conflict" as existing "whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."… 
The Geneva Conventions similarly incorporate a standard of intensity that must be 
reached to trigger the application of certain minimal rules in certain violent 
conflicts, namely those conflicts where all parties are not signatories to the 
Conventions.‖200 
 
Second, she points out the possible drawbacks of announcing terrorist as ‗enemy combatant‘ 
and its undesirable consequences.  She refers to she refers to the traditional aspect of the issue 
and maintains that, 
 
the puzzling decision of the Bush Administration to declare a global war on terror 
and to label terrorists "enemy combatants" has possibly had an unintended 
consequence for non-State actors. It has lifted certain individuals out of the status 
of criminal to that of combatant, the same category America's own troops have 
while engaging in armed hostilities. This move to label terrorists as combatants is 
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contrary to strong historic trends. From earliest times, governments have struggled 
to prevent their enemies from approaching a status of equality. Even governments 
on the verge of collapse due to the pressure of a rebel advance have vehemently 
denied that the violence inflicted by their enemies was anything but criminal 
violence. Governments fear the psychological and legal advantages to opponents 
of calling them "combatants" and their struggle a "war." Yet, the Bush 
Administration, within days of the September 11 attacks in the United States, 
declared a "global war on terror" and designated terrorists "enemy combatants.
201
 
 
As a result, O‘Connell considers the decision by US officials to treat the struggle against 
terrorism as a global war ―undermines the prohibition on the use of force, enhancing the status 
of terrorists and making the world a more dangerous place where human life is ever more de-
valued.‖202 Therefore it is time ―to call off the global war on terror.‖203 
 
Professor Greenwood shares similar views and notes that: 
Terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing humanity today. It is therefore 
entirely understandable and justifiable that we mark the gravity of that danger and 
express a commitment to defeating it by using the language of a war on terrorism. 
That is, however, a far cry from using that language in a technical, legal sense. In 
the language of international law there is no basis for speaking of a war on AI-
Qaeda or any other terrorist group, for such 
a group cannot be a belligerent, it is merely a band of criminals, and to treat it as 
anything else risks distorting the law while giving that group a status which to 
some implies a degree of legitimacy.
204
 
 
According to Marco Sassoli: 
One of the dangerous effects of the U.S. characterization of the "war on terrorism" 
as a single global international armed conflict is that, if correct, such classification 
makes deliberate attacks upon members of the "enemy armed forces" lawful 
worldwide… Thus, the United States justified an unmanned missile strike that hit 
and killed suspected members of A1-Qaeda in Yemen. Without this qualification 
under the laws of war, such targeted assassinations not preceded by an attempt to 
arrest the persons concerned would be classified as extra-judicial executions, 
which would seriously violate international human rights law. The latter accepts 
the deliberate killing of even the worst criminal only under the most extreme 
circumstances… U.S. administration officials have indeed implied that the 
President's claimed authority to designate as an enemy combatant any individual, 
including a U.S. citizen within the United States, includes authority to carry out 
extra-judicial executions, within or outside the United States, of suspects so 
designated. Under the laws of war, if those persons were combatants, such claims 
would be correct. This absurd result, permitting targeted assassinations in the 
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midst of peaceful cities, proves once more that all those suspected to be 
"terrorists" cannot be classified as combatants.
205
 
 
 
4.2.2 Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda, Taliban and Associated Forces 
 
Under the Obama Administration, the rhetoric of the ―global war against terrorism‖ has 
changed. The US is no longer engaged in a global war on terror but rather, in a war against 
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Despite this change in rhetoric the Obama 
Administration has significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside Afghanistan in a 
variety of locations including Pakistan and Yemen and thus followed the Bush 
Administration‘s view of the global battlefield. When the use of drone strikes against terrorist 
operatives in Yemen and Somalia has driven debate about whether those areas fall within the 
boundaries of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, whether any 
hostilities in those areas constitute separate armed conflicts, or whether the conflict against 
terrorists can indeed be a global one the Obama Administration made the same argument as 
did the Bush Administration that the laws of war apply to the use of drone strikes since the 
US is engaged in an armed conflict.
206
 
 
With regard to legal justification, apparently the same argument was pursued by the Obama 
Administration vis-à-vis the Bush Administration. In the Koh speech, it is argued that ―the 
United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated 
forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks.‖207 Whether the conflict between the US and 
Al-Qaeda may be characterized as an armed conflict is a controversial issue. Despite the 
agreement among the scholars that the state of armed conflict requires two criteria: a certain 
level of intensity and minimum level of organization. When it comes to whether these 
requirements have met in the conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda and its associates the 
opinions varies. For example, in an effort to legally justify the use of drone strikes within the 
context of armed conflict Orr argues that the hostilities between the United States and al 
Qaeda constitute an armed conflict. According to him the US drone strikes outside 
Afghanistan satisfy the intensity prong. In this regard he notes that: 
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One factor in the Boskoski court's evaluation of the conflict was the number of 
casualties.  The ICTY noted that the highest total estimate for the entire period at 
issue was 168, a tiny fraction of the total number of Americans that al Qaeda has 
killed. The Boskoski analysis of the intensity prong also considered how 
the…government treated the hostilities… While not dispositive, the government's 
assessment and treatment of the situation was highly significant. In this case, the 
U.S. government has obvious incentives to treat hostilities with al Qaeda as a 
war, and clearly such treatment should not be dispositive. The American 
government's response to the danger posed by al Qaeda, however, is evidence of 
its highly informed perception of that threat, and the Obama administration clearly 
perceives the threat to be significant. Hostilities between the United States and al 
Qaeda, then, are sufficiently intense to constitute an armed conflict.‖ 
 
As for the organization prong he notes that: 
―The Boskoski court's analysis under the organization prong considered factors 
including the armed group's "ability to carry out military operations," its 
"hierarchical command structure," and the existence of corresponding political 
operations. In the case of al Qaeda, all of these factors demonstrate that al Qaeda 
is sufficiently organized to satisfy the second prong of the Boskoski test. First, al 
Qaeda is clearly able to carry out military operations. Some of the group's notable 
attacks include: the attack on American military personnel in Yemen in 1992, the 
first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the bombings of the American 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
London bombings in 2005, and the bombing of the Danish embassy in Pakistan in 
2008. Second, Al Qaeda has a hierarchical command structure. A former al Qaeda 
analyst for the CIA recently described al Qaeda as a group with "bylaws, 
committee structures, [and] rules for succession." The group's governance 
structure also includes regional commanders who operate in accordance with the 
"Annual Plan" adopted at the "command council," where Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri casted ―the deciding vote[s].‖ In addition, al Qaeda has 
multiple tiers of management, and mid-level officers sometimes move up to 
replace senior leaders who die in combat. Finally, al Qaeda behaves like a 
political entity. Before the fall of the Afghan Taliban, cooperation between al 
Qaeda and that government was readily apparent. Moreover, many of the group's 
Stated goals, including the replacement of certain secular governments with 
religious leadership, are political. Therefore, al Qaeda also satisfies the 
organization prong of the Boskoski test.‖208 
 
 On the other hand in response to the Bush Administration's view that there could be a global 
armed conflict based on the existence of certain persons, the International Law Association 
(ILA) undertook a five-year study to help clarify what the definition of armed conflict was in 
international law. According to ILA report international law defines armed conflict as always 
involving at least two minimum characteristics: the presence of organized armed groups, and 
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engagement in intense inter-group fighting. Wit reference to the ILA report O'Connell argues 
that, 
the fighting or hostilities of an armed group occurs within limited zones, theater of 
combat, or combat zones. Ask any member of the U.S. or NATO armed forces 
where the U.S. is engaged in combat operations today and they will correctly tell 
you in Afghanistan and Libya.  
 
She also draw attentions to particularities of  the terrorism that should be considered as 
a crime and notes that,  
[a]lthough in some circumstances it may be carried out so continuously as to be 
the equivalent of the fighting of an armed conflict… The isolated terrorist attack, 
regardless of how serious the consequences, is not an armed conflict because 
armed conflict requires a certain intensity of fighting. This is certainly not the 
situation in the United States today. Even where the U.S. is using drones on the 
basis of consent from the territorial State, that State may not consent to use 
military force on its own, against its own people, except when it is engaged in 
armed conflict hostilities. The legal restriction on the use of military force in such 
situations is found in human rights law. The major human rights treaties, for 
example, permit derogation in situations of emergency. Outside emergency, a 
State may only take human life when absolutely necessary in the defense of 
persons from unlawful violence - in the case of immediate need to save a human 
life.
209
 
 
In fact, outside Afghanistan, characterization of the conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda, 
Taliban and associated forces as an armed conflict would be problematic within the ambit of 
the law of armed conflict. As O'Connell rightly argued, the conflict between the US and 
terrorists has been taken place in Afghanistan. Therefore, killing members of Al-Qaeda and its 
associates via the use of drone strikes in Afghanistan may be justified under the law of armed 
conflict. However, outside Afghanistan it is hard to claim that killing terrorists with drone 
strikes may fall under the scope of IHL. As pointed out before, the ground of the use of drone 
strikes outside Afghanistan has not been based on the fighting between the US and terrorists, 
it has rather relied on the assumption that members of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and associated 
forces may be targeted irrespective of the threshold of armed conflict has been achieved or 
not. Therefore, justification of the use of drone strikes outside Afghanistan cannot be 
considered as being legitimate under the rules of IHL. As a result, as UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions Philip Alston rightly noted,  
outside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted killing is 
almost never likely to be legal. A targeted drone killing in a State‘s own territory, 
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over which the State has control, would be very unlikely to meet human rights law 
limitations on the use of lethal force.
210
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
Given the fact that the need for use of force may change over the course of time in accordance 
with the developments in weaponry the State practices in creating customary international law 
carry a great value. However, since the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the most important 
rule as to the use of force and is binding on all sovereign States the cardinal principle of 
prohibition of use of force is not possibly changed by contrary State practices. In this regard 
as long as the Article 2(4) of the Charter exists the US drone strikes cannot be justifies as use 
of force in self-defense provided that it is exercised within the ambit of the Article 51 of the 
Charter. However, having considered the fact that the US started its right to use of military 
force in self-defense in response to terrorist attacks of 9/11 more than a decade ago and that 
most of the drone strikes carried out in a covert operation the justification of drone strikes on 
the grounds of use of force in self-defense even today without ―reporting the measures 
immediately to the Security Council cannot be considered as a lawful basis in the presence of 
the Article 2(4) as well as the Article 51 of the Charter. 
 
With regard to the justification for drone strikes of  being in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda 
Taliban and associated forces, it is hard to conclude in the light of the Geneva Conventions, 
ICTY judgments as well as the arguments by the scholars that the traditional meaning of 
battlefield can be expanded to the global battlefield and that the level of intensity outside 
Afghanistan would be amount to the minimum level of threshold for armed conflict. 
 
Having considered the high number of civilian deaths and casualties and the annoying effects 
of living under drones one would concluded that because of the US covert drone campaign 
terrorism today poses a much more serious threat to all nations as well as to international 
peace and security. Therefore, it can be concluded that despite the US had the legal ground for 
fighting against terrorism, instead of acting together with all nations by means of the 
involvement of the Security Council to this fight, pursuing a covert drone operations in 
response to 9/11 undermines its credibility in the eyes of the international community as a 
result of failure of commitment to international law.   
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